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MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, SECOND 
BEST, AND THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: 
A REVIEW ARTICLEt 
Richard S. Markpvits* 
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF. By 
Robert H. Bork. New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1978. Pp. xi, 462. 
$18. 
Professor Robert Bork's Antitrust Paradox1 is likely to be an 
influential book. Bork teaches at a law school (Yale) whose gradu-
ates greatly influence American regulatory policy; he enjoys the 
intellectual respect of the legal academic community; and he is 
well-connected both with the antitrust bar and (as a former Solic-
itor General) with many relevant government personnel. The 
book is written in a clear, remarkably entertaining style and 
should be comprehensible to the rapidly increasing number of law 
students and practitioners who are conversant with economics at 
the very elementary level it presupposes. Moreover, the book's 
publication is timely: its appearance coincides with the develop-
ment of a consensus in the relevant governmental communities 
that both antitrust law and its enforcement should be strength-
ened - a consensus manifested by the rapid growth of the Anti-
trust Division's budget, a rise in judicial hostility to mergers and 
even to internal corporate growth, and the serious legislative con-
sideration of various deconcentration proposals that would sub-
stantially increase the effect of antitrust law on the structure of 
American industry. 
In short, The Antitrust Paradox is likely to be read at a 
critical time for American antitrust policy by many strategically 
placed people who will be able to understand Bork's arguments. 
Those arguments support five basic propositions: (1) the legisla-
ture and judiciary have misunderstood the business functions and 
economic effects of many of the practices to which the antitrust 
laws apply; (2) in particular, vertical contracts and mergers, hori-
t Copyright © R.S. Markovits 1979. 
* Professor of Law, University of Texas. B.A. 1963, Cornell University; Ph.D. 1966, 
London School of Economics; LL.B. 1968, Yale University.-Ed. 
1. R. BORK, THE ANTrrnusT PARADOX (1978). This book is largely based on a number 
of articles Professor Bork published between 1956 and 1967. Its completion and publica-
tion were delayed for eight years - primarily by Professor Bork's service as Solicitor 
General of the United States. 
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zontal mergers, conglomerate mergers, and internal growth are 
likely to produce far more allocatively desirable "business econ-
omies"2 than the legislature and courts have supposed; (3) oli-
gopolistic, predatory, and retaliatory pricing would rarely be prof-
itable in a world without antitrust; (4) business activities (includ-
ing mergers) will reduce competition only if they produce a firm 
with a very high market share in a highly concentrated market; 
and therefore, (5) allocative efficiency would be increased if busi-
ness practices and structures were regulated far less stringently, 
rather than more stringently, as current deconcentration propos-
als recommend. Although I agree with the first two propositions, 
I disagree with the third, fourth, and hence the fifth. More partic-
ularly, in my opinion, Bork's arguments for these last three prop-
ositions are vitiated by their failure to deal adequately both with 
the product and locational differentiation that define monopolis-
tic competition and with the interdependencies that are empha-
sized by second best. 3 
This Review discusses those portions of Bork's argument that 
I believe are undermined by monopolistic competition and second 
best. I should emphasize at the outset that this focus precludes a 
balanced picture of The Antitrust Paradox. Thus, this Review 
almost totally ignores the valid core of Bork's essay: (1) his argu-
ment that the antitrust laws contain an economic test of legality; 
(2) his demonstration that partnerships, various vertical prac-
tices, horizontal mergers, and even conglomerate mergers can all 
generate considerable business efficiencies; and (3) his descrip-
tion of the way in which the courts have used various fallacious 
legal doctrines to condemn practices as anticompetitive without 
any theoretical or empirical justification. In fact, many academi-
cians who specialize in antitrust will probably feel that the dis-
agreements I will emphasize are less important than our shared 
position both on the above issues and on the appropriateness 
of predicting the economic impact of business behavior on the 
assumption that relevant actors seek to maximize their share-
holders' welfare. Nevertheless, this Review's focus can be justi-
fied on two grounds. First, my disagreements with Bork are far 
2. Professor Bork uses this expression to cover not only static cost reductions but also 
product improvements and expansion-inducing (dynamic) efficiencies that increase the 
profits of the firm in question. See id. at 7. 
3. I .will use the expressions "second best" and "second-best theory" to refer to the 
body of analysis that focuses on the fact that two imperfections may offset each other and 
the related conclusion that in an inevitably imperfect world more imperfections may be 
preferable to fewer. 
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from inconsequential. They have led me to very different legal 
and policy answers to almost every question The Antitrust Para-
dox explores. Second,. Bork's lucid and lively exposition makes 
it unnecessary for me to cover once more our common ground. 
Readers who wish to traverse this territory can want no better 
guide than The Antitrust Paradox itself. 
This Review has two parts. The first defines a series of con-
cepts I have developed to illuminate the various monopolistic 
competition phenomena and second-best interdependencies that 
Bork and all other traditional antitrust analysts have ignored. 
The second uses these tools to criticize Bork's discussion of (1) the 
particular economic test of legality American antitrust laws con-
tain; (2) the appropriate way to predict the allocative efficiency 
of any business practice; (3) the feasibility of oligopolistic, retal-
iatory, or predatory behavior; (4) the preconditions for a horizon-
tal merger's reducing competition; (5) the operational definition 
of monopoly and the actual character of various kinds of allegedly 
"monopolizing" behavior; (6) the allocative efficiency of various 
vertical practices; and (7) the competitive impact and allocative 
efficiency of both conglomerate mergers and the toe-hold merger 
doctrine. 
L SOME lNTRODUCTORY VOCABULARY 
In this Part, I will define four central sets of concepts. In 
particular, I will (1) define and distinguish between the effect of 
a business practice on competition and its impact on allocative 
efficiency, (2) differentiate several components (such as basic 
competitive advantages and oligopolistic margins) of the overall 
gap between price and marginal cost, (3) identify three types of 
factors that can enable firms to earn supranormal profits on their 
most profitable projects ( distinguish, that is, three types of fac-
tors that influence the intensity of what I call quality-or-variety-
increasing [QV] investment4 competition5), and (4) define the 
types of QV investment misallocation antitrust policy can affect. 
4. QV investments are investments that function by changing the demand curve the 
investor faces. Typical QV investments are investments in additional or superior product 
variants, additional or superior distributive locations, or additional capacity or inventory 
(which increase the speed with which the investor can supply his customers at times of 
peak demand). 
5. The phrase "QV investment competition" refers to the process in which firms 
compete away their supranormal profits by introducing new or additional product var-
iants, distributive outlets, capacity, or inventory. 
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A. Increasing Competition vs. Increasing Allocative Efficiency 
Roughly speaking, an event or legal doctrine will be said to 
increase competition if it creates more dollar gains than dollar 
losses6 for the customers of both the firm involved and its prod-
uct-market rivals (though not necessarily for each individual cus-
tomer). This result could obtain either because the event or doc-
trine increases price competition (i.e., lowers the prices such buy-
ers have to pay for a given set of product-distributive vari'ants) 
or because it increases QV investment competition (i.e., increases 
the quality or variety of the products and services they are of-
fered). In contrast, an event or legal doctrine will be said to in-
crease allocative efficiency only if on balance it creates more dol-
lar gains than dollar losses for all the various parties it affects. 
Obviously, then, since an event that benefits on balance the cus-
tomers of both the firm involved and its product-market rivals 
(henceforth Rs) may injure on balance the other parties it affects 
(e.g., stockholders of various injured rivals or buyers of the goods 
that would have been produced with the resources used to in-
crease the firm's unit output), there is no definitional guarantee 
that an event that increases competition may not decrease alloca-
tive efficiency or vice versa. Nor can one establish this relation-
ship by citing the fact that allocative efficiency will be maximized 
if competition is everywhere perfect and various other so-called 
Pareto optimal conditions are met, for that fact has no bearing 
on the allocative efficiency of increasing competition, other 
Pareto imperfections, or both. In fact, although, as we shall see, 
various second-best arguments can be made for the allocative 
efficiency of pro-price competition policies both in general and in 
particular circumstances, increases in QV investment competi-
tion are far more allocatively suspect in our inevitably imperfect 
world. Hence, we must recognize the distinction between the allo-
cative efficiency and competitive impact of a business practice or 
antitrust doctrine. 
6. The beneficiaries' dollar gains should be measured by the number of dollars they 
would have to be paid to make them as well off as they would be if the merger were 
executed (assuming that their receipt of the dollars would not affect their welfare indi-
rectly - e.g., by being fmanced by a tax on individuals who would otherwise have patron-
ized them). The victims' dollar losses should be measured by the number of dollars they 
would have to lose to make them as bad off as they would be if the merger were executed 
(assuming that they would not be indirectly affected by the loss in question). 
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B. The Components of a Firm's Price-Marginal Cost Gap 
Price theorists have always focused on the aggregate gap be-
tween a firm's price and its marginal cost (P-MC). However, in 
our monopolistically competitive world, in which product and 
locational differentiation are significant, we cannot analyze the 
competitive effects and allocative efficiency of business behavior 
or legal doctrines without distinguishing several components of 
the P-MC gap. To simplify my exposition, I will discuss only 
individualized pricing situations, in which sellers set separate 
prices with each of the buyers for whom they deal.7 In particular, 
I will examine the gap between the individualized price actually 
charged by a best-placed supplier,8 X, of some particular buyer, 
Y, and that seller's conventional marginal cost. I will distinguish 
two major and four minor components of this gap. The two major 
components of the P-MC gap are divided by the "highest nonoli-
gopolistic price" (HNOP). This is the price that would maximize 
a best-placed seller's profits in a perfectly informed world if he 
could not profit from oligopolistic pricing. In other words, a best-
placed seller's highest nonoligopolistic price is the highest price 
he could charge without being profitably undercut by any rival, 
assuming that the best-placed seller in question could not react 
to such undercutting. 
In my vocabulary, the gap between such a firm X's highest 
nonoligopolistic price and actual price (P-HNOP) is its "oligop-
olistic margin" (OM). X's oligopolistic margin (and oligopolistic 
pricing) is "contrived" when he has tried to deter undercutting 
by threatening to sacrifice his interests in order to punish his 
rivals' noncooperation by retaliating or by promising to reward 
his rivals' cooperation by reciprocating (i.e., by foregoing a 
profitable opportunity to undercut an OM the rival has charged). 
X's oligopolistic margin (and oligopolistic pricing) is "natural" 
when he can assume that his rivals will not undercut because they 
realize that his nonoligopolistic, profit-maximizing response 
7. Sometimes sellers post prices that apply across-the-board to all buyers interested 
in their products. In the text that follows, such situations will be referred to as across-
the-board pricing contexts. 
8. A seller Xis said to be best-placed to supply a particular buyer Y ifhe could profit 
from supplying Y on terms that no one else would find intrinsically profitable to match. 
Obviously, since different buyers will have different product and locational preferences 
in our monopolistically competitive world, the fact that X is best-placed to serve some 
buyer YI implies little about the likelihood that he will be best-placed to supply other 
buyers Y2 ... N. 
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would make such conduct unprofitable. 9 
I also subdivide the gap between a best-placed seller's mar-
ginal cost and his highest nonoligopolistic price. In individualized 
pricing contexts, this gap reflects (1) the seller's "basic competi-
tive advantage" (BCA) and (2) the contextual costs his closest 
rival would have to incur to beat his HNOP. 
In my terminology, "basic competitive advantage" refers to 
the short-run position of a seller vis-a-vis a particular buyer he is 
best-placed to serve. More precisely, a best-placed seller's basic 
competitive advantage in his relations with his customer equals 
the amount by which that buyer prefers the best-placed seller's 
product or distributive variant to the offering of that seller's clos-
est rival for the buyer's patronage, plus the amount by which the 
short-run conventional marginal costs the best-placed seller has 
to incur to supply this buyer fall below those of his closest rival 
for this buyer's patronage-i.e., equals the sum of the best-placed 
seller's buyer preference advantage and his short-run marginal 
cost advantage.10 
The contextual component of a best-placed seller's (X's) P-
MC gap reflects costs his closest rival must incur (because of the 
terms he would have to charge) to beat the best-placed seller's 
HNOP. Since price discrimination tends to encourage favored 
customers to engage in arbitrage, disfavored customers to inten-
sify their bargaining, and the government or private parties to 
bring Robinson-Patman Act suits, rivals who charge their own 
customers supramarginal-cost prices must incur contextual mar-
ginal costs to charge X's customers the discriminatory, low, 
marginal-cost prices necessary to beat X's HNOP. The contex-
tual component of X's HNOP can also be described as the sum 
of X's contextual marginal costs and his contextual cost advan-
tage (CCA) over his closest rival. Best-placed sellers normally 
enjoy such CCAs because their HNOPs are normally less discrim-
inatory than their closest rivals' matching offers. Hence, a best-
placed seller's overall competitive advantage (OCA) usually ex-
ceeds his BCA (by an amount equal to his CCA) .11 
9. In my opinion, this distinction between contrived and natural oligopolistic pricing 
has substantial legal significance. In brief, I believe that contrived oligopolistic pricing 
violates the Sherman Act while natural oligopolistic pricing does not. 
10. Obviously, in individual cases, a best-placed seller's BCA may equal the differ-
ence between his product preference advantage and short-run marginal cost disadvantage 
or vice versa. 
11. For an analysis of the across-the-board counterparts for these terms, see Marko-
vits, Predicting the Competitive Impact of Horizontal Mergers in a Monopolistically Com-
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C. The Determinants of the Intensity of Quality- or Variety-
Increasing Investment Competition 
Economists have generally assumed that the intensity of QV 
investment competition and price competition depend on identi-
cal factors. In fact, however, the determinants of the relationship 
between price and ( conventional) marginal cost, on the one hand, 
and of the (nominal)12 rate of return established firms can realize 
in equilibrium on their most profitable QV investment projects, 
on the other, differ substantially.13 
In brief, 14 three sets of factors influence the intensity of QV 
investment competition. The first set contains the various bar-
riers to entry that would deter the QV investment of the firm that 
would be the best-placed potential entrant to the "market"15 at 
the entry-barring QV investment level. These barriers all deter 
entry by reducing the supranormal rate of return the potential 
entrant anticipates realizing after entry to a level below the rate 
the established firms realized befor~ entry on their most profit-
able projects. More particularly, the profit-differential barrier to 
entry (1r0 ) reflects those factor~ that would reduce the new en-
trant's weighted average expected post-entry rate of return below 
the rate the established firms would expect to realize on their 
most profitable projects post-entry even if the threat of retalia-
tion could be ignored. The risk barrier to entry (R) refers to those 
factors that increase the normal rate of return for the best-placed 
new entrant above its counterpart rate for the established firms 
on their most successful projects (e.g., product variants or out-
lets). The scale barrier to entry (S) measures the extent to which 
petitive World: A Non-Market Oriented Proposal and Critique of the Market Definition, 
Market Share-Market Concentration Approach, 56 TExAs L. REv. 587, 637-40 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Horizontal Mergers]. 
12. For the meaning and relevance of the word "nominal," see text following note 15 
infra. 
13. In part, such differences reflect the direct effect potential competition has on the 
intensity of QV investment competition. See Markovits, Potential Competition, Limit 
Price Theory, and the Legality of Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers Under the Ameri-
can Antitrust Laws, 1975 WIS. L. REv. 658 [hereinafter cited as Limit Price Theory]. 
However, in part, they reflect the facts that in individualized pricing markets QV invest-
ment moves have more widespread effects than price moves, that in most markets they 
affect different groups of sellers than price moves, and that in all markets they 'are less 
reversible than price moves. 
14. For a more complete set of definitions and illustrations, see Horizontal Mergers, 
supra note 11, at 660-73. 
15. "Market" is in quotation marks to reflect the fact that none of my legal and policy 
proposals presuppose the possibility of defining markets in a nonarbitrary way. See Hori-
zontal Mergers, supra note 11, at 595-602. 
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the best-placed potential entrant's entry will reduce everyone's 
rate of return. The retaliation barrier to entry (L) measures the 
extent to which the new entrant's expected rate of return over the 
full life of his investment is reduced by the possibility that his 
established rivals may retaliate against his entry. 
The second set of such factors contains the barriers to expan-
sion that would deter the QV investment of the established firm 
that would be best-placed to execute a QV investment if QV 
investment in the relevant market had reached the level it would 
contain in equilibrium if entry were precluded. Once more, analo-
gous 1rD, R, S, and L* barriers to expansion (where the asterisk 
indicates the hypothetical, entry-precluded assumption) account 
for the fact that this best-placed expander's expected, post-
expansion, nominal supranormal rate of return will be lower than 
the rate the established firms would expect to realize absent ex-
pansion on their most profitable projects. 
The third set of such factors relates to the fact that the actual 
rate of return such a best-placed expander will anticipate realiz-
ing on his expansion may differ from the nominal rate of return 
a conventionally kept set of books would indicate. Thus, to the 
extent that such an expander realfzes that his failure to expand 
would not induce anyone else to add to his market's QV invest-
ment level, his expansion's actual profitability will be reduced by 
the amount of profits his new project takes from his old (by taking 
sales away from his original products or outlets or by inducing his 
rivals to lower their prices). That is, the best-placed expander will 
face a "monopolistic investment disincentive" (M*) 16 equal to the 
ratio of such avoidable damages to the size of the envisaged QV 
investment. (When in the more general case an expander realizes 
that his expansion will deter someone else from a QV investment 
that would be more damaging to his pre-existing capital than his 
own expansion, he will face a monopolistic incentive to expand.) 
In any case, within this framework, the intensity of QV invest-
ment competition (i.e., the rate of return the established firms 
can realize in equilibrium on their most profitable QV investment 
projects) will be determined by the lower of (7rn + R + S + L)N 
at the entry-barring QV investment level and (7r D + R + S + L*)E 
16. In some circumstances, such an expander will realize that although none of his 
rivals would invest if he did not, some would expand if he makes a QV investment, In 
such situations, the expander in question is said to face an oligopolistic investment disin-
centive (0). In order to simplify my exposition, such O disincentives will be ignored in the 
text that follows. 
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+ M* at the entry-precluded, expansion-barring QV investment 
level, where N and E respectively stand for the relevant best-
placed potential entrant and expander .17 
D. Three Types of QV Investment Misallocation 
Until recently, economists who analyze the optimality of the 
set of goods the economy produces rarely considered the possibil-
ity that an inefficient set of product or distributive types might 
be produced. In fact, except when so-called public goods18 were 
involved, such economists considered only "relative unit output" 
(RUO) misallocation - the possibility that the economy might 
produce too many units of some goods and too few units of other 
goods that were still in production. Recently, however, econo-
mists have asked whether imperfections in price competition 
(and other Pareto imperfections) may cause the economy to pro-
duce the wrong set of product or distributive types even when 
public good problems do not arise. In fact, three types of such QV 
investment misallocation can be distinguished: intra-industry 
QV investment misallocation, inter-industry QV investment mis-
allocation, and quantity-vs.-QV investment misallocation. In 
brief, intra-industry QV investment misallocation is present 
where a transaction-costless transfer of resources could increase 
allocative efficiency by changing the set of product or distributive 
variants some industry produced without changing the amount of 
QV investment it contained. Inter-industry QV investment mis-
allocation is present where such transfer could increase allocative 
efficiency by increasing the QV investment {product variants, 
distributive variants, capacity, or inventory) in some industries 
17. Where (1r 0 + R + S + L)N is less than (1r 0 + R + S + L*)E + M* at the 
entry-preventing level, the entry-preventing level of QV investment is determinative 
because it is higher than the entry-precluded, expansion-barring QV investment level 
- i.e., because the presence of potential competition will preclude the established firms 
from taking advantage of the ability they would otherwise have to restrict their own QV 
investments. On the other hand, where (1ro + R + S + L*)E + M* is less than 
(11" 0 + R + S + L)N, at the entry-preventing level, the entry-precluded, expansion-
barring QV investment level will be determinative because it is higher than the entry-
barring QV investment level - i.e., because the established firms' inability to restrict 
their QV investments will preclude them from taking advantage of the opportunities the 
existing barriers to entry present. 
18. Although the term "public goods" has been used in other ways as well, I believe 
it is most usefully employed to refer to products whose marginal costs would be less than 
their average total cost at the output at which their demand and marginal cost curves 
would interesect if the other Pareto optimal conditions were fulfilled. Public goods cause 
problems in an otherwise Pareto optimal world because, if they are priced at their mar-
ginal cost, they will not be produced, while if they are priced at their average total cost, 
they will be underproduced. 
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and decreasing it in others. Finally, quantity-vs.-QV investment 
misallocation is present where such a transfer could increase allo-
cative efficiency by causing the economy to produce more physi-
cal units of a less diversified, less conveniently distributed, less 
quickly delivered set of products ( or vice versa) - i.e., by produc-
ing a situation in which fewer (more) resources are allocated to 
QV investment uses and more (fewer) to uses that increase unit 
output. 
This section has developed a series of concepts that I will now 
use to analyze Bork's position on most of the issues he addresses. 
Obviously, such a conceptual structure is never "right" or 
"wrong." Its value depends solely on its ability to facilitate the 
identification and solution of the problems it is used to analyze. 
I hope that the analysis that follows will enable me to carry the 
burden of proof that any proponent of a new vocabulary should 
be made to bear. 
For the reader's convenience, the abbreviations used in this 
Review are here summarized. 
BCA Basic Competitive Advantage 
BPA Buyer Preference Advantage 
CCA Contextual Cost Advantage 
CMC Contextual Marginal Cost 
ABS- The reduction in buyer surplus generated by 
a particular marginal increase in a product's 
ASS+ 
ATS-
HNOP 
L 
M* 
MC 
MLC 
MLV 
OM 
OMC 
p 
QV 
price 
The increase in seller surplus generated by a 
particular marginal increase in a product's 
price 
The reduction in transaction surplus 
generated by a particular marginal increase 
in a product's price 
Highest Nonoligopolistic Price 
Retaliation Barrier (to entry or expansion) 
Monopolistic Investment Disincentive 
Marginal Cost 
Marginal Allocative Cost 
Marginal Allocative Value 
Oligopolistic Margin 
Overall Marginal Cost 
Price 
Quality-or-Variety-Increasing 
(investment) 
Jan.-Mar. 1979] 
R 
RUO 
s 
TSM 
71"D 
Monopolistic Competition 
Risk Barrier (to entry or expansion) 
Relative Unit Output (misallocation) 
Scale Barrier (to entry or expansion) 
Transaction-Surplus-Maximizing (output) 
Profit-Differential Barrier (to entry or 
expansion) 
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II. MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, SECOND BEST, AND BORK'S 
LEGAL AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
A. The American Antitrust Laws' Particular Economic Test of 
Legality 
As I have already suggested, Bork argues persuasively that 
the American antitrust laws contain an economic test of legality. 
This section will analyze his more specific contention that since 
"the only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maxi-
mization of consumer welfare," the statutes must be presumed to 
use words like "competition" as "terms of art" that should be 
operationally defined in terms of "consumer welfare" - i.e., 
that acts should be held to decrease competition or constitute 
monopolization or agreements in restraint of trade only if they 
decrease "consumer welfare." More precisely, since Bork uses 
"consumer welfare" itself as a term of art, equivalent to the 
applied welfare economist's phrase "allocative efficiency,"19 this 
section will focus on the contention that acts should be held to 
violate the antitrust laws only if they create more dollar losses 
than gains. 
I have two basic objections to Professor Bork's discussion of 
the antitrust laws' economic test of legality. The first goes to the 
substance of his contention that the antitrust laws were intended 
to foster allocative efficiency. Although I am persuaded by Profes-
sor Bork's arguments that the history, language, and structure20 
of the antitrust laws preclude construing the statutes to achieve 
various noneconomic {primarily political and social) goals, this 
19. Except for one lapse in which he equates increases in consumer welfare with an 
increase in utility, Bork specifies that any act that creates more dollar gains than losses 
increases "consumer welfare." R. Boruc, supra note 1, at 297. 
20. I am less persuaded by the argument Professor Bork derives from his assumption 
about the appropriate role for a judiciary to play in a democratic society- largely because 
I believe that at least in theocy judges can balance competing considerations of signifi-
cantly different character without reference to their own personal values. I should note 
that Professor Bork has taken this position against balancing in other contexts as well. 
See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 
(1971). 
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conclusion does not imply that the laws were devised to promote 
allocative efficiency. Roughly speaking, I believe that the purpose 
of the American antitrust laws is to protect buyers from being 
injured by behavior undertaken-by sellers with the "intent" 
(Sherman Act)21 or the effect (Clayton Act)22 ofreducing competi-
tion, in the sense of reducing the attractiveness of the offers 
against which the actors and sometimes their product-market 
rivals must compete when best-placed. As we shall see, this prem-
ise would lead to quite different legal tests from Bork's. Second, 
however, even if the American antitrust laws contained an alloca-
tive efficiency test, Bork's use of the phrase "consumer welfare" 
would distort this test. Although Bork's "consumer welfare" test 
is dollar-oriented and is not solely concerned with the position of 
the relevant actor's customers, "consumer welfare" has unjusti-
fied emotive force for those interested in the distribution of in-
come, a force Bork could have avoided by calling his test an 
allocative efficiency test of legality. This description would also 
have facilitated his discussion of those vertical practices which 
clearly would injure the buyer!, they affect even if they were as 
allocatively efficient as he supposes. 
Let me proceed, then, to describe the tests I believe the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts prescribe. In my opinion, the Sherman Act 
condemns conduct whose profitability was expected to depend on 
its-tendency to reduce the attractiveness of offers against which 
the accused parties compete. For example, price-fixing agree-
ments, horizontal mergers, and individual or joint acts of retalia-
tion or predation would violate the Act if their participants would 
not have expected23 to find them profitable but for their tendency 
to reduce the attractiveness of a rival's offer by inducing him to 
make less attractive bids or by eliminating him as an indepen-
dent force in the marketplace.24 Correlatively, a practice that 
21. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)). 
22. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976)). 
23. Although this test is subjective, the relevant intent would probably be demon-
strated most often through objective evidence. 
24. More specifically, I would argue that § 1 should be interpreted to prohibit agree-
ments whose profitability depended on their reducing the attractiveness of the offers their 
participants give to each other's customers while § 2 should be interpreted to prohibit 
single-firm or multi-firm conduct whose profitability depends on its reducing the attrac-
tiveness of the offers one or more innocent parties make to the customers of the accused. 
On this account, a price-fixing agreement would violate § 1, predatory or retaliatory be-
havior would violate § 2, and a horizontal merger could violate either § 1 (if its profit-
ability depended on its reducing the competition the merger partners gave each other) 
and/or § 2 (if its profitability depended on its reducing the competition remaining rivals 
gave the merger partners). 
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reduced the attractiveness of rival offers would not violate the 
Sherman Act if its profitability were not expected to depend on 
its reducing the attractiveness of rival offers - if it were 
"ancillary" in this sense to some legitimate business p~rposes 
such as achieving what Bork calls "business efficiencies" or en-
abling a seller to take better advantage of a ,given demand-
marginal cost position. In brief, this interpretation fits better 
with the language, criminal prov.isions, and tort antecedents of 
the Sherman Act and with th~ scheme of Ameripan regulatory 
policy, which recognizes the legitimacy of securing profitable po-
sitions by increasing efficiency and capitalizing on such positions 
by exploiting the resulting demand-marginal cost combination. 
Compared with Bork's, this interpretation has three further ad-
vantages: (1) it defines "ancillary" better than Bork's "primary 
effect" test;25 (2) it explains why behavior that clearly infores·the 
actor's customers (by removing consumer surplus) does not vio-
late the Sherman Act despite its tendency to· reduce consumer 
welfare in the most obvious literal sense; and (3) it accounts for: 
(a) the fact that the legality of an act that is anti-competitive in 
my sense could not be established by a demonstration that it 
would not misallocate resources in our worse-than-second-best 
world and (b) the fact that a misallocative act would not be said 
to violate the Sherman Act if its profitability did not depend on 
any tendency it had to reduce the_ attractiveness of the offers 
against which the actor had to compete (or, a fortiori, if it had 
no such tendency). 
Admittedly, since the Clayton Act speaks of the effects of 
behavior rather than the intent of the relevant actors, the Sher-
man Act test should not be applied in Clayton Act litigation. In 
particular, with two possible exceptions, behavior covered by the 
Clayton Act should be said to violate its terms if and only if it 
reduces competition in the sense of reducing on balance the at-
tractiveness of the offers against which best-placed suppliers 
must compete (including both the actor in question and his 
product-market rivals). On this interpretation, a horizontal 
merger would violate the Clayton Act if it reduced the attractive-
ness of the offers made by non-best-placed suppliers even .if its 
profitability did not depend on any such consequence. Indeed, on 
this interpretation, the Clayton Act might even condemn a hori-
zontal merger that did not reduce the attractiveness of the rival 
25. See R. Boru<, supra note 1, at 136, 334. 
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offers the parties to the merger faced- e.g., if the merger reduced 
the attractiveness of the offers the merger partners made to their 
rivals' customers or the m~rger partners' rivals made to each 
other's customers. The two exceptions I would read into this 
Clayton Act test are difficult to reconcile with the language of the 
statute. However, if the antitrust laws were devised to protect 
buyers from direct injury by illegitimate business behavior, a 
court might be authorized to condemn only those acts that do 
injure the relevant buyers by reducing the attractiveness of rival 
offers. In addition, one might (more problematically) argue that, 
given the legitimacy of obtaining a natural monopoly under 
American law,28 the Clayton Act does not condemn practices that 
do injure buyers by reducing the attractiveness of the offers 
against which best-placed suppliers must compete if those prac-
tices do so by creating allocative efficiencies that induce inferior 
rivals to exit. 
Economically literate lawyers rarely distinguish between the 
legality of a practice or act under the American antitrust laws and 
the desirability of a policy prohibiting the behavior in question 
(which they usually equate with the allocative efficiency of the 
policy concerned). Bork's discussion of the antitrust laws' tests of 
legality fits this surprising pattern. Although I am persuaded that 
the antitrust laws contain an economic test of legality, they 
should not be interpreted to condemn those acts and only those 
acts that it would be allocatively efficient to condemn. At least 
in part, my disagreement with Bork reflects my opinion that in 
our worse-than-second-best world, courts that seek to increase 
allocative efficiency often must condemn acts that are not anti-
competitive and allow acts that are. Although I would probably 
support legislation to increase the allocative efficiency of the anti-
trust laws, the courts are not authorized to interpret the law to 
achieve that goal. I suspect Bork would agree with this contention 
if he were persuaded that the connection between the allocative 
efficiency of prohibiting a particular practice and its competitive 
impact is as weak as I suppose. In any case, the tests I have 
proposed are both more forthright than Bork's "consumer wel-
fare" test and more compatible with the language, historical an-
tecedents, criminal provisions, and statutory environment of the 
American antitrust laws. 
26. That legitimacy is made manifest by the patent laws, the "superior skill, fore-
sight, and industry defense" to Sherman Act prosecutions, and the judicial practice of 
arguing that condemned practices serve no legitimate business purpose. 
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B. Predicting the Allocative Efficiency of Any Business Practice 
This section will explore the relevance of monopolistic com-
petition and second best both for Professor Bork's analysis of the 
allocative efficiency of various business practices and for the ap-
propriate way to analyze the allocative efficiency of alternative 
antitrust doctrines. In particular, this section (1) explams how 
supracompetitive prices distort resource allocation, (2) analyzes 
the two premises on which Bork bases his allocative efficiency 
predictions, (3) shows why - as Bork contends - second best 
probably would preclude the development of an allocative effi-
ciency rationale for pro-competitive policies if - as Bork assumes 
- antitrust law could not affect the amount of resources allo-
cated to producing quality and variety in different industries and 
in the economy as a whole, and (4) explains why second best does 
not preclude the development of an allocative efficiency rationale 
for antitrust law in a monopolistically competitive world, in 
which the set of product types the economy produces can be 
affected by antitrust policy - i.e., examines whether and the 
extent to which the supracompetitive prices that individually can · 
cause RUO misallocation, inter-industry QV investment misallo-
cation, and quantity-vs.-QV investment misallocation will com-
pound or offset each other in relation to each of these types of 
misallocation. 
1. The Misallocative Tendency of Supracompetitive Pricing 
Ceteris paribus, X's supracompetitive pricing will distort 
resource allocation by artificially reducing the private cost Y 
must incur to purchase the resources producer X would otherwise 
have used to produce his marginal unit of output below the allo-
cative cost of Y's removing the resources from X (the allocative 
value of the foregone marginal unit of X's product X). Roughly 
speaking, the private and allocative cost of Y's bidding resources 
away from X diverge because of three relationships: (1) the pri-
vate cost to Y of inputs (M) will depend on their marginal revenue 
product for X (the product of their marginal physical product in 
terms of X and the average mar_ginal revenue X receives for the 
goods in question - MRPM = (MPPmJ (MRx)); (2) the allo-
cative cost to Y of using these resources will equal their marginal 
allocative product in X's hands (the allocative value of the sac-
rificed units of X = MLP1.uc, = MPP.Mx (MLVx) = MPPx(Px) 
582 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:567 
since the marginal allocative value of X will normally27 equal 
Px); and (3) Px will exceed MRx whenever X's price is supra-
competitive (unless X engages in perfect price discrimination 
down to the price level in question). Obviously, other things 
being equal, from the perspective of allocative efficiency, this 
divergence between the private and allocative cost of Y's bid-
ding resources away from X will distort all of Y's choices that 
affect his purchases of resources that X would otherwise use. 
Thus, since the marginal cost to Y of producing marginal units 
of his product with X's resources will be less than the allocative 
cost of his doing so, X's supracompetitive pricing will tend, 
ceteris paribus, to cause Y to produce too many units of his prod-
uct. Similarly, since the cost to Y of using X's resources to create 
a new QV investment or to take advantage of such an investment 
by producing units of the new product will be less than the allo-
cative cost of his doing so, X's supracompetitive pricing will tend, 
ceteris paribus, to induce Y to introduce too many product var-
iants or to operate too many outlets. Finally, since the private 
savings Y can achieve by discovering a new cost-reducing produc-
tion technique that will free additional resources for uses by X 
will be less than the allocative savings he thereby achieves, X's 
supracompetitive pricing may tend, ceteris paribus, to induce Y 
to do too little production-process research; conversely, since the 
private cost to Y of taking resources from X to do such research 
will be less than the allocative cost of his doing so, X's supracom-
petitive pricing may also tend, ceteris paribus, to induce Y to do 
too much research. Having seen how supracompetitive pricing 
can misallocate resources, we can analyze Bork's method for pre-
dicting the allocative efficiency of any business conduct or anti-
trust doctrine. 
2. Bork's Two Predictive Premises 
Bork's allocative efficiency analysis has two premises: (1) 
any tendency a practice may have to decrease (increase) the unit 
output of a given product will almost always worsen (improve) 
relative unit output (RUO) allocation, and (2) privately profit-
able changes in a seller's product-service package will generally 
also be allocatively efficient. The first of these premises is in-· 
correct, and the second ignores the most important issues raised 
27. The marginal allocative value of any given product is equal to its actual dollar 
value to its actual consumer plus any external benefits or minus any external costs his 
consumption of this good generates. Hence, MLVx = Px if the relevant buyer is a non-
monopsonistic consumer sovereign and his consumption ofX does not generate any exter-
nalities. 
Jan.-Mar. 1979] Monopolistic Competition 583 
by the ability of antitrust policy to affect the set of product types 
offered by the economy. 
Bork recognizes that the general theory of second best at 
least calls the first premise into question. He responds to second 
best in three ways.28 First, he dismisses the theory's relevance by 
arguing that the present antitrust laws do not authorize the 
courts to consider second best. Although I agree with this conten-
tion, it does not justify Bork's ignoring the theory's implications, 
since much of his book niakes an ultimate policy case for antitrust 
regulation. Second, Bork tries to justify ignoring second best by 
arguing that the theory does not in itself indicate the probability 
that an anti-competitive event will improve resource allocation. 
Indeed, Bork says second best demonstrates only the possibility 
of such a result. Although the basic theory of second best ob-
viously cannot by itself generate probabilities for specific cases, 
it is more useful than Bork seems willing to concede: in particu-
lar, basic second-best theory demonstrates that, unless one can 
devise an argument to the contrary, reductions in competition (or 
in Pareto imperfections in general) must be considered as likely 
to decrease as to increase RUO allocation (or resource misalloca-
tion in general). Fortunately, as I have argued elsewhere29 and will 
suggest below, one can develop operational arguments that indi-
cate when anti-competitive events will be likely to misallocate 
resources in our worse-than-second-best world. Third, Bork tries 
to handle second best by asserting that second-best arguments 
require one to make "judgments in gross" and "call for the end 
of antitrust policy."30 Neither response is adequate. The first is 
irrelevant. As Bork himself often repeats, the cost and inaccessi-
bility of relevant data mean that economic policy decisions must 
usually be based on judgments in gross. The second is both incor-
rect and irrelevant. It is incorrect because, as we shall see, even 
in our worse-than-second-best world various allocative arguments 
can be devised to support a general policy favoring price competi-
tion (and further arguments can be devised to support such poli-
cies in - roughly speaking - atypically monopolistic industries). 
28. See R. BoRI<, supra note 1, at 113-14. 
29. See Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our 
Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Critique of the Chicago Approach to 
the Study of Law and Economic,s, 1975 WIS. L. REv. 950 [hereinafter cited as Second 
Best]; Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation: 
A Checklist for Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Checklist]. 
30. R. BoRI<, supra note 1, at 114. 
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It is irrelevant because one cannot ignore an argument simply 
because its implications are devastating. 
Unfortunately, although I do not think that second best de-
stroys the case for pro-price competition policies, it does destroy 
Bork's initial premise that any conduct that decreases (increases) 
the relevant actor's unit output will increase (decrease) RUO 
misallocation ( or can reasonably be assumed to do so). Diagram 
1 illustrates my analysis. It contains three curves. MCx indicates 
the private marginal cost the producer of product X must incur 
to produce successive units of his product. MLV x indicates the 
marginal allocative value of X - the actual dollar value of suc-
cessive units of X to their actual consumers plus or minus any 
external benefits or costs generated by their consumption of units 
of X. Our discussion will make the neutral assumption that 
MLV x = DDx, the demand curve for X - which indicates the 
price for which successive units of X could be sold. Finally, Dia-
gram 1 also contains a marginal allocative cost curve for X 
(MLCx), which indicates the allocative value of the units of those 
goods Y that would be produced if the marginal unit of X were 
not. By definition, X's optimal output will be determined by the 
intersection of MLVx = DDx and MLCx. while X's competitive 
output (the output - OA - that will result if X's price equals 
its marginal cost - AE) will be determined by the intersection 
of MLVx = DDx and MCx. Therefore, X's optimal output will 
coincide with its competitive output if MLCx equals MCx. Thus, 
so long as X's initial price is not below its marginal cost, the 
assumption that MLCx equals MCx will assure Bork's conclusion 
that any event that reduces output will increase RUO misalloca-
tion. For example, if MLCx equalled MCx, an event that reduced 
X's output from OB to OC (by raising its price from BF to CG) 
would cause an additional FIJG in resource misallocation. But 
unfortunately, as we have seen, where the resources used to pro-
duce X would otherwise be used to produce some other good Y 
whose price exceeds its marginal cost, MLC-.g: will exceed MCx. 
Correlatively, X's allocatively optimal output (which is deter-
mined by the intersection of MLCx and MLV x) will be lower 
than the output at which MCx and DDx intersect - OD in 
Diagram 1. Obviously, given this fact, an event that reduces X's 
output below the level at which MCx and DDx intersect may 
improve, not worsen RUO allocation by bringing X's output 
closer to its allocatively optimal level. Thus, in Diagram 1, an 
event that reduces X's output by raising its price from BF to CG 
would improve RUO allocation by MLFG. In general, an event 
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that reduces X's output by raising X's price will not increase 
RUO misallocation unless it increases the absolute difference 
between the P/MC ratios of X and Y.31 Clearly, then, so long as 
we look at material goods and services rather than leisure, there 
is no general reason to believe that unit-output-reducing events 
will increase the gap between the relevant product's actual and 
optimal outputs (that price-increasing events in X will increase 
the gap between X's and Y's P/MC ratios). Hence, Bork's prem-
ise that a unit-output-decreasing event will increase RUO mis-
allocation must be rejected in our worse-than-second-best world. 
$ 
DIAGRAM 1 
31. At least, this result occurs ifwe assume that the total amount ofRUO misalloca-
tion between X and Y increases with the amount by which such allocation would be 
improved by the production of one additional unit of the under-produced good (the mar-
ginal misallocation between X and Y). Thus, if we assume that Xis under-produced and 
that all Pareto imperfections other than imperfect competition can be ignored, this 
marginal misallocation will equal MLVx - MLCx = MLVx - MRTv/x(MLV'i) = P.x -
(MCx/MCv) Pv = MCx (Px/MCx - Py'/MCy). Since most of the events with which we 
are concerned will not" affect MCx (which appears to be constant in most industries 
over significant variations in output), the effect of an event on the marginal RUO misallo-
cation between X and Y will generally depend on its impact on the absolute difference-
between their P/MC ratios. (A more sophisticated analysis would have to reflect the 
P/MC ratios and relative importance of X's and Y's complements.) 
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Let us turn now to Bork's second premise - that it will be 
allocatively efficient for a firm to introduce any product type it 
finds profitable. There are three problems with this premise. 
First, even if, like Bork, we focus on a firm's decision to produce 
one product variant rather than another, and even if we assume 
that the new product type is no more expensive than its predeces-
sor, a privately profitable product shift may be allocatively ineffi-
cient. Such a shift might misallocate resources - i.e., might 
cause intra-industry QV investment misallocation - if the pro-
duction or consumption of the new product generates more exter-
nalities, if its sale generates less consumer surplus, or if it is 
produced with resources that would otherwise be used to increase 
the unit output of goods that are priced more monopolistically 
than the goods-that were produced with the resources released 
from the production of its predecessor. Admittedly, however, 
given the cost of obtaining the relevant data, the absence of any 
systemic bias favoring the substitution of such new products, and 
the low probability that such differences in externalities, con-
sumer sovereignty, or factor market competitors would cause 
such misallocation, Bork's presumption probably makes good 
policy sense in the situation described. 
Unfortunately, the second problem with Bork's presumption 
is far more serious. If the new product variant costs more to 
produce than its predecessor, there probably is a systemic bias 
favoring its introduction - i.e., a systemic tendency to misallo-
cate resources by substituting more expensive for less expensive 
product variants. In brief, this follows from our conclusion that 
the private cost of the additional resources used to produce the 
more expensive variant will be less than their allocative cost to 
the extent that they are withdrawn from the production of goods 
whose prices exceed their marginal costs. Although one can de-
bate the practicabi~ity of using the antitrust laws (or tax laws) to 
prevent such misallocation, Bork's presumption is, in this con-
text, problematic. 
Third, and finally, I am positive that Bork's presumption 
should not be applied to situations in which sellers are introduc-
ing additional product variants, capacity, or distributive outlets 
rather than substituting new ones for old. In fact, Bork - like 
virtually all economists - never asks whether antitrust affects 
the extent to which our economy generates quantity-vs.-QV in-
vestment misallocation and inter-industry QV investment misal-
location. As I have argued elsewhere in some detail and will sug-
gest in a moment, these two types of misallocation are probably 
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both more substantial and more remediable than the kinds of 
relative unit output (RUO) misallocations on which Bork and 
virtually all other contemporary economists focus. At a mini-
mum, the distortions that produce such misallocations would 
make me suspect that an additional product variant would prob-
ably be misallocative even if privately profitable ~ particularly 
if {speaking roughly) the new variant competed primarily against 
products with atypically high P/MC ratios. 
In short, neither of the two premises on which Bork bases his 
allocative efficiency predictions is satisfactory. The first is simply 
incorrect, and the second is both incorrect and too restricted in 
its coverage. 
3. Antitrust, Second Best, and RUO Misallocation 
As I have already suggested, Bork appears to fear that on my 
interpretation second best would preclude an allocative efficiency 
rationale for antitrust. I suspect Bork's fears would be justified 
if, as he implicitly assumes, antitrust could not improve top-level 
allocation by changing the amount of product variety, distribu-
tive variety, and speed of service various industries and the econ-
omy as a whole offer. 
To see why, let us analyze the ability of an anti-price-fixing 
statute to improve RUO allocation. Since, as we have seen, an 
individual price fix in X will worsen inter-industry RUO alloca-
tion only if it increases the difference between Px/MCx and its 
weighted average counterpart for X's competitor Y, there is no 
particular reason to suppose that a universal prohibition of price 
fixing would improve inter-industry RUO allocation. Moreover, it 
may not even be possible to devise a more selective price-fixing 
statute that would improve inter-industry RUO allocation. Ad-
mittedly, since the average P/MC ratio of the distant competitors 
of any product probably equals the average P/MC ratio in the 
economy, one might argue for prohibitions of price fixing by firms 
with higher-than-average P/MC ratios by pointing out such a 
rule's tendency to improve RUO allocation among distant com-
petitors. However, I doubt that many resources flow between such 
distant competitors. Moreover, although the RUO resource flows 
among moderately close competitors are clearly much larger, I 
doubt that they support the kind of crudely selective policy now 
under consideration. Thus, if - as I assume - products that are 
often well-placed to obtain the patronage of the same buyers tend 
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to have similar P/MC ratios,32 prohibitions of price fixing by firms 
with higher-than-average P/MC ratios would not be likely to im-
prove RUO allocation by increasing the deterred price fixers' unit 
outputs and decreasing their moderately close competitors' (by 
reducing the former's P/MC ratios to levels that are closer to the 
latters'). Hence, I doubt that one could develop a strong alloca-
tive case for this kind of crudely selective price-fixing prohibition 
if such a policy could not affect the set of product types produced. 
Nor could one make a strong RUO allocation case for more 
refined, selective policies that prohibited price fixing by firms 
whose P/MC ratios are higher than their moderately close com-
petitors'. At least, this conclusion is implied by my assumption 
that close competitors tend to have similar P/MC ratios. This 
assumption is critical because it suggests both (1) that there is 
not much RUO misallocation among moderately close competi-
tors in the first place and (2) that refined and costly data would 
be needed to determine whether a given prohibition would be 
likely to reduce the absolute difference between the relevant 
P/MC ratios. Accordingly, if antitrust could increase allocative 
efficiency only by improving inter-industry RUO allocation, one 
would be hard put to establish an allocative rationale for prohibi-
tions of price fixing. In second-best language, this conclusion 
would be attributed to the fact that the major Pareto imperfec-
tions that are relevant for the analysis ofRUO misallocation (the 
economy's various supracompetitive prices) are offseting and 
my assumption that the offsets in question are relatively perfect. 
Admittedly, even if antitrust could not improve resource al-
location by changing the set of products produced, one might still 
base an allocative rationale for price-fixing prohibitions on their 
tendency (1) to reduce the undercutting and retaliation that can 
cause intra-industry RUO allocation, (2) to improve labor-leisure 
allocation, (3) to redistribute income in a more allocatively effi-
cient direction, (4) to decrease present-vs.-future consumption 
misallocation, (5) to reduce the kind of production-optimum 
misallocation caused by underinvestment in production-process 
research, and perhaps (6) to reduce total transaction costs. 
32. There are several reasons to believe in such a correlation: (1) since goods that are 
competitive will tend to be differentiated to similar degrees, buyers who favor them may 
tend to have similar preferences for them over their closest competitor (so that their 
producers enjoy similar BCAs); (2) since goods that are competitive will tend to be distrib-
uted in similar fashions, their industries may be similarly "concentrated" (so that their 
producers are similarly placed to contrive oligopolistic margins). Although obvious 
counterexamples can be posed (oil and coal), I do believe that such a correlation exists. 
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However, I doubt the prospects for justifying price-fixing 
statutes in this way. 33 
Obviously, this analysis also speaks to antitrust's ability to 
improve resource allocation by prohibiting anti-competitive 
mergers. In fact, our previous conclusions apply with but one 
qualification: since even anti-competitive mergers may reduce 
the merger partners' fixed and marginal costs, the prospects for 
an allocative rationale for horizontal mergers are weaker than 
those for price-fixing prohibitions.34 
In short, since MC does not equal MLC in our worse-than-
second-best world, the prospects for developing an allocative ra-
tionale for various kinds of pro-price-competition policies would 
not be good if such regulations could not affect the amount of 
resources devoted to increasing quality and variety in various 
industries and in the economy as a whole. Although this conclu-
sion is consistent with Bork's horizontal-merger policy recom-
33. For a discussion of all these points, see Checklist, supra note 29. 
34. Since Professor Bork bases his conclusions about the desirability of prohibiting 
horizontal mergers on Oliver Williamson's welfare trade-off analysis of a price-increasing, 
cost-reducing horizontal merger, it may be useful to illustrate the relevance of second best 
by examining its significance for the Williamson analysis. See R. BoRK, supra note 1, at 
107-10 (summarizing Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoff, 58 AM. EcoN. REV. 18 (1968)). Diagram A has been devised to illustrate our 
analysis of the kind of event on which Williamson focused: a horizontal merger in industry 
X that raised the price of X from AG to BH and reduced its output from OA to OB (and 
thereby increased the output of some competitive good Y) while decreasing the marginal 
cost of producing X from MC, to MC, (from OD to OC). According to Williamson, the 
allocative efficiency of such a horizontal merger will depend on whether the misallocation 
he associates with the reduction in X's output and increase in Y's is outweighed by the 
allocative efficiencies he associates with the reduced private cost of producing X. At least 
if we focus on the supracompetitive character of most goods' prices, second best will cut 
against antitrust intervention in Williamson's calculus both by reducing the RUO misallo-
cation such an output-reducing merger is likely to produce and by increasing the allocative 
value of the private cost reductions it effectuates. Thus, since Williamson assumes that 
MLC = MC, he argues that the merger portrayed in Diagram A would cause HGMK in 
RUO misallocation if it did not generate any efficiencies. As we have seen, however, since 
MLC will exceed MC where Py exceeds MCv, the merger-induced reduction in X's output 
from OA to OB may not have such a negative impact on RUO allocation. In fact, on the 
assumptions manifest in Diagram A's construction of MLC, > MC, , the lost units of X's 
output would actually have been associated with RUO misallocation of JIGH pre-merger 
- i.e. the merger-induced reduction in X's input will improve RUO allocation by JIGH. 
Moreover, second best also suggests that Williamson has underestimated the allocative 
value of the cost reductions generated by such mergers. Once more, Williamson's results 
are distorted by his assumption that MC equals MLC. In fact, however, as we have seen, 
where Py exceeds MCy, a given private cost reduction that enables X to free some re-
sources for use by Y will generate an even larger allocative gain - i.e., MLC, will exceed 
MLC, by more than MC, exceeds MC,. Thus, in Diagram A, MLC, - MLC; = OF -
OE exceeds MC,- MQ, = OD- OC- i.e., the allocative savings, FJRE, that the merger 
will generate exceed the private savings, DKLC. 
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mendation, it does undercut his strong support of anti-price-
fixing legislation. In fact, however, as we shall now see, in our 
monopolistically competitive world in which the amount of pro-
duct differentiation, distributive differentiation, and speed of 
service can be affected by antitrust policies, it is possible to 
develop an allocative rationale for selective or indeed even 
universal pro-price-competition policies by focusing on their 
ability to influence the amount of QV investment in various 
industries and the economy as a whole. 
4. Second Best, Pro-Price-Competition Policies, and QV Invest-
ment Misallocation 
This section will explain why it should be possible to de-
vise pro-price-competition policies that will increase allocative 
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efficiency by affecting the amount of resources allocated to 
various QV investment uses both in particular sections of the 
economy and in the economy as a whole. It will begin by analyz-
ing why second best does not preclude such grand conclusions 
where QV investment misallocation is concerned. As we saw, 
second best is particularly damaging to the RUO case for anti-
trust interventions because where such misallocation is con-
cerned the relevant imperfections in price competition not only 
are offsetting but probably tend to be quite perfectly offsetting. 
As we shall see, however, the imperfections in price competition 
that are relevant for inter-industry QV investment misallocation 
are far less perfectly offsetting than their counterparts for RUO 
allocation (among moderately close competitors) while the im-
perfections in price competitjon that are relevant for quantity-
vs.-QV investment misallocation are actually compounding. 
Let us examine each of these relationships in turn. Ob-
viously the imperfections in price competition that are relevant 
for RUO misallocation are those that relate to the two prod-
ucts-say X and Y-between which consumers choose. As we 
have seen, these imperfections will have offsetting effects in rela-
tion to RUO misallocation. Thus, since Y's supracompetitive 
price reduces X's optimal output below the volume at which DDx 
= MCx by raising MLCx above MCx, it will offset what would 
otherwise be the tendency of X's supracompetitive price to cause 
X to be under-produced. Moreover, as we saw, since most unit-
output flows probably take place between close competitors and 
since close competitors probably tend to have similar P/MC ra-
tios, the offsets will probably often be close to perfect. 
By way of contrast, although the effects of the supracompeti-
tive prices that are relevant for inter-industry QV investment 
misallocation are offsetting, they are not likely to be so perfectly 
offsetting. The supracompetitive prices that are relevant for 
inter-industry QV investment misallocation (say between indus-
tries X and A) are the prices that would be charged by the prod-
uct market rivals Xl ... N and Al ... N of the marginal QV 
investors (X* ·and A*) in the two industries. This relationship 
reflects the fact that X* and A* either will take or can be treated 
as if they will take the resources they use to produce their new 
products from those rivals whose former customers their new 
products will obtain. Thus, since X* will take most of his custom-
ers from Xl ... N, Xl ... N's supracompetitive prices will 
artificially inflate the profits X* can make through using this QV 
investment in X, rather than abandoning it, by artificially deflat-
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ing the private cost to X* of the unit-output-increasing resources 
he must combine with his QV investment to produce units of his 
variant X*. On the other hand, since by assumption the cost to 
X* of creating his QV investment will equal the profits A* could 
realize by using his QV investment (the value of the alternative 
QV investment to A*), the same argument implies that Al . . . 
Ns supracompetitive prices will artificially deflate X*'s incentive 
to make a QV investment by artificially inflating the profits A* 
can make by using his alternative QV investment (by artificially 
deflating the cost to A* of the unit-output-producing resources he 
would combine with his QV investment). Hence, like their RUO 
counterparts, the supracompetitive prices that are relevant for 
inter-industry QV investment misallocation will also tend to pro-
duce offsetting distortions. However, the offsets in question are 
likely to be far less perfect in this QV investment context. In part, 
this conclusion reflects the fact that X* and A* are far less likely 
to be close competitors than X and Y - that inter-industry QV 
investment flows are not likely to take place between close com-
petitors, who tend to have similar P/MC ratios. To see why, note 
that although an event that increases the unit output of steel 
(e.g., a reduction in ~teel's price) is likely to reduce the unit 
output of its close competitor aluminum, an event that increases 
QV investment (capacity) in steel (e.g., a price increase in steel) 
is likely to increase QV investment in aluminum as well (since an 
increase in steel's price will tend to increase profits in the 
aluminum industry). In part, however, this conclusion reflects 
the fact that the net affect of Xl . .. Na and Al . . • . N's_supra-
competitive prices on X*'s QV investment decision will depend 
not only on the respective P/MC ratios but also on the effective 
tax rate applied to business earnings in the two industries and the 
sales to QV investment ratios for X* and A* .35 This conclusion 
also reflects the fact that inter-industry QV investment alloca-
tions can be caused by a large number of other factors that dis-
tort individually the profits any given industry's marginal QV 
35. If we ignore externalities, factor taxes, and other market imperfections, the dis-
tortions affecting the use of the marginal QV investqient in ipdustry X, (DU/QV~),.are 
equal to (1-T][((P-MC]/P)(PQ/QV)-CS/QV-(M+O)iWQV]-T(LV/QV) where T stands 
for the effective tax rate applied to the profits generated by the marginal QV investment 
in X, (P - MC)/P stands for the average (P - MC)/P ratio of those goods that lose sales to 
the new product (roughly the ratio in industry X), PQ stands for X's marginal QV 
investor's sales (price times quantity), QV stands for the size of his QV investment, CS 
stands for the consumer surplus the sale of his new product will generate, (M + 0) l:H.' 
stands for the monopolistic or oligopolistic investment disincentives facing X's marginal 
QV investor, and LV stands for the allocative value of the marginal QV investment in X. 
For a fuller discussion, see Second Best, supra note 29, at 1015-29. 
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investors would realize by using his QV investment. Obviously, 
these results imply that inter-industry QV investment may be 
both more substantial and more detectable than its RUO coun-
terpart. In-particular, since marginal QV investors in industry X 
will probably withdraw resources from QV investment uses in 
many industries that have average distortions, industry X will 
tend to have relatively too much (little) QV investment if the 
rate of return its marginal QV investors can realize by using 
their completed QV investments is artificially inflated more 
(less) than its weighted-average counterpart in the economy as.a 
whole. Although this conclusion does not provide a rationale for 
a universal pro-price-competition policy, it does support a 
crudely selective policy of increasing price competition in indus-
tries in which the profitability of using a QV investment is artifi-
cially inflated to a greater-than-average extent (in which DU/QV 
is greater than average). 
Moreover, the supracompetitive prices that are relevant for 
quantity-vs.-QV investment misallocation actually produce com-
pounding effects. The prices that are relevant in this context are 
those charged by the product market rivals Xl . · . . N of the 
marginal QV investor X* and those charged by X*'s factor-
market rival B (whose unit output will be reduced if X* creates 
his QV investment). As we have seen, Xl ... Ns supracompeti-
tive prices will tend to induce X* to make a QV investment by 
artificially inflating the profits he can make by using his com-
pleted QV investment (e.g., by producing units of his newly de-
signed and promoted product) while B's supracompetitive price 
will tend to induce X* to create a QV investment (to design and 
promote a new product) by artificially reducing the cost he has 
to incur to do so (by reducing the private cost of X*'s bidding the 
necessary resources away from B below the allocative cost of his 
doing so). Since, then, all the relevant supracompetitive prices 
artificially inflate the profitability of using resources to create QV 
investments, our analysis implies both (1) that too much of the 
economy's resources are allocated to QV investments and (2) that 
pro-price-competition policies will virtually always increase allo-
cative efficiency by reducing the resources allocated to QV invest-
ment. 
In short, in my opinion, Bork's failure to deal with monopo-
listic competition has caused him to ignore the best allocative 
arguments for universal or crudely selective pro-price-
competition policies in our worse-than-second-best world. But 
though I do believe that antitrust policies can be justified in 
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terms of their effects on QV investment, this rationale leads to 
somewhat nontraditional policy conclusions. For example, the 
preceding analysis implies (1) that the desirability of a given 
intervention will increase with DU/QV rather than with P/MC 
and (2) that pro-QV-investment competition policies may be allo-
catively undesirable since they will always exacerbate quantity-
vs.-QV investment allocation by increasing QV investment and 
will normally worsen inter-industry QV investment allocation as 
well (since they will tend to apply primarily in industries in which 
DU/QV is higher than average). However, although one might 
also support such a policy for purely distributive reasons, I am 
convinced that a well-designed antitrust policy can be justified 
by its impact on allocative efficiency in· our worse-than-second-
best world. 
C. Predatory and Oligopolistic Pricing 
This section will analyze Bork's conclusions about the im-
portance of predatory and oligopolistic pricing. Bork argues that 
predatory and oligopolistic pricing would be unprofitable even if 
they were not illegal; I believe that both are far more profitable 
than Bork suggests. At least in part, our disagreement derives 
from my rejection of two assumptions Bork has implicitly 
adopted: (1) the pre-monopolistic competition assumption that 
all firms that are well-placed to obtain the patronage of any 
buyer will be equally well-placed to obtain his patronage and 
(2) the assumption that any seller who wishes to engage in pred-
atory price-cutting or to react to his rivals' responses to his oligo-
polistic price must do so across the board - i.e., by changing the 
price he charges all the customers with whom he deals. 36 
In predatory pricing, a seller X lowers his prices sufficiently 
to force a rival victim V to exit in circumstances in which the 
relevant price reductions would not have been profitable but for 
their tendency to drive V out of business. Bork stresses that pre-
datory price wars are at least in part wars of attrition won by the 
last firm to use all its reserves. Since Bork assumes that each 
firm's reserves will be proportionate to its market share, he con-
cludes that the successful predator must inflict proportionately 
more losses on his victim (relative to their respective sizes) than 
36. Professor Bork does not realize the extent to which his conclusions would be 
altered in an individualized pricing world if nonmarginal cost pricing were introduced. See 
R. BORK, supra note 1, at 149. 
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on himself. Realistically assuming that the predator will tend to 
be larger than its victim, Bork shows that.under certain condi-
tions, predation will not be profitable because the predator will 
bear proportionately more costs than his smaller victim.37 Bork's 
argument presumes that the predator must reduce his prices 
across the board and that his rivals? prices would equal their 
I 
marginal costs in the absence of predation - i.e., that the 
predator's victims would enjoy neither BCAs nor OMs (on their 
marginal sales) in the absence of predation. Unfortunately, 
when these conditions are not fulfilled, large predators can often 
inflict the necessary harm on their victims at an absolutely lower 
and not just a proportionately lower cost to themselves. To see 
why, suppose (1) X can lower his price selectively to his victim's 
(V's) customers and (2) Venjoys significant BCAs. In this case, 
X can take away each of V's customers whom Xis second-best-
placed to serve at a direct cost38 of one cent39 while X can take 
away those of V's customers for whom he is not V's closest rival 
at a cost of one cent plus the amount by which X is worse-than-
second-best placed.40 On the other hand, the harm X can inflict 
on V for stealing one of V's customers equals the BCA V enjoyed 
in his relations with that customer.41 
Thus, a seller who is often one of the best-placed competitors 
of a rival who enjoys significant competitive advantages may be 
able to deprive his victim of substantial and critical42 profits rela-
37. See id. at 147-55. 
38. I will ignore the contextual costs of various pricing strategies throughout this 
section. 
39. Assume, for example, that there are no contextual costs, that V's and X's mar-
ginal costs are both one dollar, and that Venjoys a buyer preference advantage often cents 
in relation to the relevant customer Y. If X is V's closest rival, he will be able to steal Y 
with a price that is eleven cents below X's HNOP of $1.10 - i.e., with a 99¢ price that is 
one cent below his own marginal costs. 
40. Thus, if in the above example Z was V's closest competitor, X also had one dollar 
cost, but V had a twelve cent buyer preference advantage over X, then X could not steal 
Y without offering him a price of 97¢ (thirteen cents below V's HNOP and three cents 
below X's own marginal cost). 
41. In our example, this is the ten cent profit V would have realized at his HNOP. 
The above analysis assumes that Vis not charging oligopolistic prices. 
42. I should note that the fact that the victim enjoys large BCAs (so that the preda-
tor's harm inflicted to cost incurred ratio will be relatively high for some levels of harm 
inflicted) does not imply that the predator will have to inflict a great deal of harm to drive 
his victim V out in the long run. Ceteris paribus, victims will exit if they realize subnormal 
returns on their operations. Thus, if V expects predation to continue indefinitely, the 
critical amount of profits will be the amount of supranormal profits he realized pre-
predation: obviously, the sum of a number of large BCAs may still not constitute a large 
amount of supranormal profits on V's investment. I should also note that the speed with 
which such a V will exit will also depend on how soon he will have to renew his plant and 
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tively cheaply.43 Hence, predatory pricing may be profitable, at 
least where (1) the presence of the predator's victim substantially 
reduces the predator's profits44 and either (2) the victim is better 
placed to operate in the market than any potential competitor 
would be to enter the market or any other established firm would 
be to expand its QV investments45 or (3) the victim is substan-
tially more harmful to the predator than his replacement seems 
likely to be. 48 
Bork also believes that oligopolistic pricing will not take 
place without overt collusion and that overt collusion among 
oligopolists frequently breaks down.'7 Accordingly, although fa-
voring vigorous attacks on price fixes when they are discovered, 
he denies that deconcentration policies or highly restrictive 
merger rules can be justified by their effect on oligopolistic pric-
ing. Although these positions are consistent with his analysis of 
the cost of predation, 48 Bork bases them primarily on (1) various 
inadequacies he sees in traditional oligopolistic price theory, (2) 
the absence of empirical evidence supporting the view that tradi-
tional oligopolies practice oligopolistic pricing, and (3) various 
types of empirical evidence gleaned from antitrust cases. Neither 
Bork's arguments nor his conclusion are persuasive to me; natu-
ral, tacitly contrived, and overtly contrived oligopolistic pricing 
are all greater problems than Professor Bork supposes. 
equipment and how much he can realize by selling to alternative users. (Obviously, how-
ever, X will not benefit if V sells out to someone who will simply duplicate V's operations.) 
43. I.e., the seller will tend to have a harm to cost ratio for effective retaliation that 
is far above one. Obviously, the predator will minimize the cost of his retaliation by 
stealing those customers in relation to whom this harm to cost ratio is highest. 
44. E.g., where the victim was often the predator's closest competitor by a substantial 
amount. 
45. I.e., the victim's QV investment will not be replaced: since in our monopolisti-
cally competitive world, a new entrant or expanding established firm may not be able to 
recreate or match the established victim's managerial team, product reputation, or dis-
tributive system, ease of entry will not always be "symmetrical with ease of exit," as Bork 
supposes. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 153. 
46. Admittedly, Professor Bork's skepticism about the significance of predatory pric-
ing largely reflects the paucity of documented cases of such behavior and his doubts about 
the feasibility of distinguishing predatory behavior from legitimate aggressive price com-
petition. See id. at 154-55. 
47. See id. at 181. 
48. Which implies that oligopolistic pricers who had to rely on retaliation to secure 
their rival's cooperation would have to incur prohibitive costs to do so. 
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Bork's theoretical attack on oligopoly theory focuses on its 
prediction that oligopolists will substitute a high rate of product 
differentiation for price competition.49 Bork argues that 
"[i]deally, from the oligopolists' point of view, products should 
be identical"50 and that "[c]onventional oligopoly theory ought 
to predict a lessening of product competition, just as it predicts 
a lessening of price competition. 51 He then attacks such a re-
formed oligopoly theory by pointing out that it cannot account for 
the substantial product rivalry often found in oligopolistic mar-
kets. However, maximizing oligopolists would not produce identi-
cal products, and product rivalry (QV investment competition) 
might well coexist with oligopolistic pricing. Thus, although 
product standardization may facilitate oligopolistic pricing, it 
will probably not be ideal from the oligopolists' perspective, since 
where consumers value diversity, standardization will reduce the 
profits the oligopolists' price cooperation can generate. Moreover, 
product rivalry (QV investment competition) may be intense 
where oligopolistic pricing is being practiced, since the presence 
of effectiye potential competitors may prevent the established 
firms from restricting QV investment in their markets without 
eliminating their incentives or ability to secure oligopolistic mar-
gins. 52 Hence, oligopolistic price theory would not be disconfirmed 
by active product and locational rivalry in conventional oligopo-
listic markets - i.e., in concentrated markets, in which relatively 
few sellers have very high market shares. As we shall see, a more 
sophisticated oligopolistic price theory - one taking monopolis-
tic competition into account - would not in any case suggest a 
strong or highly significant cross-market correlation between the 
incidence of oligopolistic pricing and the concentration of tradi-
tionally defined markets. 
Obviously, this last conclusion also undercuts any possible 
significance of the failure of the various rate of return versus 
concentration studies to produce consistent, strong correlations. 
Such concentration rate of return studies would have no signifi-
cance even if oligopolistic price theory did suggest such a correla-
tion between market price structure and oligopolistic margins, 
for, in our monopolistic competitive world, rates of return will 
49. Id. at 187. 
50. Id. at 188. 
51. Id. at 187. 
· 52. For a fuller discussion of the differences between the determinants of price and 
QV investment competition, see Horizontal Mergers, supra note 11, at 687 n.186. 
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depend on the intensity of QV investment competition, which 
will not correlate well with the profitability of oligopolistic pric-
ing. 53 Although, obviously, I sympathize with Professor Bork's 
desire for evidence, I doubt we can test oligopolistic price theory 
in the real world. Thus, even if oligopolistic pricing theory did 
imply a correlation between concentration and OMs, we could 
not test it in the other "straightforward" way that has been tried 
- viz., by doing a cross-industry study of the relationship be-
tween (P-MC) and concentration - for increases in concentra-
tion would probably lead to increases in (P-MC) even if they did 
not raise OMs (since they would be associated with increases in 
BCAs in any case). In the end, then, one's estimates of the im-
portance of oligopolistic pricing may have to depend both on one's 
experience and on the results of a theoretical analysis of the prof-
itability of such pricing. 
Professor Bork's conclusions that oligopolistic pricing cannot 
occur unless it is overtly contrived are based on "[e]vidence 
supplied by antitrust cases" that "(1) a large price drop occurs 
when even one firm appears to challenge an established monopo-
list; (2) oligopolists are frequently discovered in overt collusion; 
and (3) even overt collusion among oligopolists frequently breaks 
down .... " 54 For several reasons, I find this evidence unper-
suasive: (1) the type of one-firm challenge Bork describes would 
clearly decrease prices by reducing BCAs even if it did not affect 
OMs and (2) the existence of numerous instances of overt and 
unsuccessful collusion is not inconsistent with the existence of 
many more cases of successful oligopolistic pricing of all sorts 
(natural, tacitly contrived, and overtly contrived). Although my 
experience is much more limited than Professor Bork's, it does 
suggest much more pessimistic conclusions than his. 
My belief in the empirical importance of oligopolistic pricing 
primarily reflects my theoretical analysis of the profitability of 
such pricing. In fact, my analysis suggests that in some circum-
stances, sellers can obtain oligopolistic margins without incurring 
any costs. Thus, sellers who can rely on the fact that they would 
find it possible and directly profitable to beat any undercutting 
53. For an elaboration of this point, see Markovits, A Response to Professor Posner, 
28 STAN. L. REV. 919, 943-44 (1976). Bork attributes high rates of return to superior 
efficiency. See R. BoRK, supra note 1, at 181. However, if the number of efficient firms 
that did not face high (1r0 + R) barriers was sufficient to preclude each from confronting 
(M + 0) disincentives, their own QV investment competition would prevent them from 
realizing supranorrnal returns. 
54. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 181. 
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offer a rival chose to make to their customers may not need to 
deter their rivals from undercutting by incurring the cost of retal-
iating against their undercutters or reciprocating to their coopera-
tive rivals. In particular, in individualized pricing contexts, sell-
ers will be able to practice oligopolistic pricing naturally when-
ever (1) the strategic and mechanical cost55 of changing their 
initial bid is less than the profits they would have realized ab 
initio at the reduced price and (2) buyers are sufficiently likely 
to give their best-placed suppliers a chance to rebid to make their 
second-best-placed suppliers reluctant to incur the mechanical 
and strategic costs of calculating and communicating an under-
bid. 56 
55. In my terminology, the strategic costs of such a price change are the costs it gene-
rates for a seller by angering customers who already have bought his product at the re-
cently announced higher price (and who therefore may refuse to buy the product in the 
future, irrational as that may seem, or may make negative statements about the product's 
general quality to other potential buyers) and/or by inducing customers to respond to 
any price changes he should effectuate in the future by delaying their purchases in the 
expectation that, in time, these prices also will be reduced. The mechanical costs of 
changing a newly announced price are the cost of communicating the change to one's 
sales organization as well as the cost of physically retagging the goods or changing some 
associated advertising. I should note that in across-the-board pricing contexts a seller 
may reduce both the strategic and mechanical costs of such price changes by making pre-
mature price announcements, which will enable him to change his originally announced 
price before he has tagged his products or made any sales if his rivals do not lock them-
selves into satisfactory price responses. 
56. Thus, the ability of a seller to obtain a natural OM will increase with the costs 
its closest rival has to incur to calculate and make its bid. I should note that the probabil-
ity that a given buyer will give his best-placed supplier an opportunity to beat an underbid 
may be inversely related to the size of the OM this supplier has tried to obtain (or more 
directly to the extent to which the underbid is more attractive than the original offer the 
buyer received from his best-placed supplier). This inverse relationship may occur (1) 
because the extent to which the buyer's "non-rational" annoyance at his supplier's at-
tempt to obtain an "undeserved" natural OM will increase with the size of the natural 
OM the underbid reveals, (2) because the extent to which a buyer finds it strategically 
useful to sacrifice short-run returns to establish his unwillingness to allow his suppliers 
to abuse him by obtaining substantial natural OMs also may increase with the size of the 
natural OMs sought, or (3) because buyers who obtain substantial underbids may be more 
likely to conclude that their best-placed supplier has miscalculated and could not now 
change his bid without incurring prohibitive strategic or mechanical costs - i.e., because 
such buyers may conclude that it would not even be in their short-run interest to incur 
the cost of offering their best-placed supplier the opportunity to bid again. (The buyer 
will have to incur both mechanical and strategic costs to give his best-placed supplier a 
chance to rebid. The mechanical costs are simply the costs of recontacting the relevant 
seller. The strategic costs, which are far more important, are the losses the buyer will 
sustain because of the tendency of such a move to deter his inferior suppliers from under-
bidding his superior suppliers in the future. Accordingly, the strategic costs a buyer will 
have to incur to recontact his best-placed supplier will increase with the visibility of his 
behavior and the extent to which he will engage in individualized transactions with knowl-
edgeable partners in the future. I should also note that the ability of a seller to obtain 
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Moreover, my analysis also suggests that sellers may be able 
to contrive oligopolistic prices relatively cheaply even when they 
cannot obtain OMs naturally. Since, as we have seen, the cost to 
an individual pricer X of stealing some rival R's customer is often 
far less than the resulting harm to R, X can often inflict deterrent 
harm57 on a prospective undercutter R relatively cheaply. Specifi-
cally, the cost to X of such retaliation will tend to be lower the 
lower R's OCAs, the more frequently X is well-placed to steal R's 
customers relative to the number of times R is well-placed to steal 
X's, and the greater X's ability to detect the fact that he has been 
undercut and to identify his undercutter. 58 In addition, a seller 
who cannot obtain OMs naturally can reduce the cost of contriv-
ing oligopolistic prices by offering to reward those rivals who do 
not undercut him by not undercutting their oligopolistic prices. 
Thus, at virtually no cost to him, 59 a seller X can benefit his rival 
R by the size of X's competitive advantage over the third-best-
placed supplier of those of R's customers whom Xis second-best-
placed to supply. 60 Although these benefits will rarely be large 
natural OMs will increase with his OCAs since the probability that a seller would not find 
the strategic and mechanical cost ofreducing his initial price prohibitive will increase with 
the profits he would have made had he charged the lower price originally; this probability 
will increase the seller's ability to obtain a natural OM both directly and by increasing 
the likelihood that the relevant buyer will give him an opportunity to rebid.) 
57. In general, to deter others, the oligopolistic pricer will have to deprive the under-
cutters he identifies of more profits than they realized by undercutting him, since his 
potential undercutters will realize that he will not always be able to detect that he has 
been undercut (since he may lose customers through changes in taste that deprive him of 
his best-placed position) and to identify his undercutters so that he will not always 
retaliate against his undercutters. 
58. The cost of retaliation affects the profitability of retaliation in two ways: first, 
by affecting the losses the oligopolistic pricer has to sustain when he does have to retaliate 
effectively and, second, by influencing the credibility of his threat to retaliate (and hence 
the probability that he will in fact be undercut and have to retaliate) by reducing the 
profitability of his carrying out his threat. 
59. In a world without antitrust, the cost to X of making and fulfilling his promise 
to R will equal the certainty equivalent profits he could make by undercutting R if R 
charged an oligopolistic price without securing X's cooperation or if X induced R to charge 
such a price and then welshed on his promise of cooperation. Since I doubt that R would 
continue to charge such a price on his own if X consistently undercut him and am certain 
that X could not welsh on such promises without destroying his ability to dupe his rivals, 
I expect that the relevant costs are trivial. 
60. Let us assume that R, X, and R's next closest rival Z could all supply some 
buyer Y at a marginal cost of one dollar, but that Y had a ten cent preference for R's pro-
duct over X's and a twenty cent preference for R's product over Z's. In this case, X could 
enable R to raise his price from $1.10 to $1.20 without incurring a risk of undercutting. 
(The text assumes that R has not secured anyone else's cooperation. Thus, if R had 
already secured Z's cooperation in the above example, the value of X's cooperation would 
be increased by an amount equal to Z's advantage over R's third closest competitor for 
Jan.-Mar. 1979] Monopolistic Competition 601 
enough to deter a rival from undercutting a large amount of oli-
gopolistic pricing, they will often substantially reduce the retalia-
tory harm the oligopolistic pricer must threaten. Moreover, since 
the ratio of harm inflicted to cost incurred will decline for each 
successive act of retaliation, a firm's ability to reciprocate will 
reduce the cost of the retaliation it must threaten by a greater 
proportion than it reduces the harm it must threaten. Hence, 
oligopolistic pricing may also be profitable for firms that cannot 
obtain OMs naturally and who would have to incur prohibitive 
costs to secure their rivals' cooperation exclusively through 
threats and acts of retaliation. 
Obviously, the profitability of contrived oligopolistic pricing 
will also depend on many other factors. 61 Nonetheless, this analyr 
sis suggests why I am not surprised by my own experience -;.. 
which indicates that natural and contrived OMs are far mor~ 
common than Bork supposes. 
In short, I believe that Bork underestimates the incidence of 
both predatory and oligopolistic pricing. Although such pricing 
will be difficult to prove, 62 I suspect that far more resources 
Y's patronage. Similarly, when X is not Y's closest competitor, his cooperation will be 
valuable to R if R has already secured the cooperation of X's other superiors.) 
61. Thus, the size of the most profitable contrived OM for·an individualized pricer 
to seek from some buyer Yl will be inversely related to the .size of his OCA when dealing 
with YI (which determines the amount of safe profits he must risk to do so) and directly 
related to the sum of the OCAs he enjoys in his relations with buyers Y2 . . . N (which 
affects the credibility of his threats by determining the amount of profits his retaliation 
will protect). 
62. Thus, the fact that a price is below marginal cost does not establish its predatory 
character since such a price may be promotional- i.e., since its profitability may depend 
on its ability to increase the future sales of the relevant product by increasing consumers' 
experience with it. Similarly, the fact that a price exceeds marginal cost, average total 
cost, or even the seller's highest nonoligopolistic price does not establish its nonpredatory 
character. Thus, in an across-the-board pricing situation, a seller may charge a price 
that contains a lower oligopolistic margin than he could have obtained naturally in order 
to drive a rival out of business. Unfortunately, there are also no simple ways to determine 
the oligopolistic character of a price (much less to determine whether an oligopolistic price 
has been contrived, ob4lined naturally, or charged by mistake). More particularly, I 
believe there are only three ways to determine whether particular prices are oligopolistic: 
the first, straightforward (but costly) method· determines whether a particular price is 
oligopolistic by computing the highest nonoligopolistic price and comparing it with the 
actual price; the second, comparative method infers the existence of an OM from inter-
temporal or inter-regional price differences that cannot be accounted for by non-
oligopolistic factors (e.g., differences in BCAs) that would affect the relationship between 
the relevant HNOPs; the third, behavioral, method infers the existence of an OM from 
proof of behavior that is normally associated with contrived oligopolistic pricing - such 
as acts of reciprocation or retaliation. For an analysis of the inadequacy of some of the 
other methods that have been proposed for identifying oligopolistic prices (such as the 
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should be devoted to their detection and prevention. 
D. The Competitive Impact of Horizontal Mergers 
Professor Bork argues that mergers up to sixty or seventy 
percent of the market will be very unlikely to reduce competi-
tion.63 "Partly as a tactical concession to current oligopoly phobia 
and partly in recognition of Section 7's intended function of 
tightening the Sherman Act rule," he recommends that section 7 
be interpreted to make "presumptively lawful all horizontal 
mergers up to market shares that would allow for other mergers 
of similar size in the industry and still leave three significant 
companies."6' This section will be divided into two parts: the first 
will summarize the most important ways65 in which a horizontal 
merger can affect the intensity of price and QV investment com-
petition;66 the second will explain why predictions of the competi-
tive impact of horizontal mergers should not be based on the kind 
of market concentration and market share data on which Bork 
relies - i.e., why it would be more accurate and more cost-
effective to predict the competitive impact of horizontal mergers 
price discrimination test, excess capacity test, supranormal profit test, and straightfor-
ward price difference test), see Markovits, supra note 53, 940-49. 
63. R. BoRI<, supra note 1, at 221. 
64. Id. at 221-22. 
65. For a more complete summary, see Horizontal Mergers, supra note 11, at 690-97. 
66. In what follows, I will adopt Professor Bork's and the courts' assumption that in 
normal horizontal merger cases, such an analysis should be made by comparing the 
situation the merger would produce with the status quo. Admittedly, this procedure may 
allow horizontal mergers that would otherwise have been replaced by more pro-
competitive internal growth, non-horizontal mergers, horizontal mergers, or resource re-
leases (managerial dismissals or dividend declarations which release resources to more 
pro-competitive alternative uses by others). However, in most situations, a requirement 
that two merger partners show that their merger's prohibition would not have deterred 
them from engaging in more pro-competitive conduct would probably be self-defeating, 
given the tendency of such an approach to deter firms from engaging in any horizontal 
mergers at all. Of co,urse, there are situations in which the mergers would not be likely to 
be deterred - viz., where one of the MPs was a failing company or clearly would not take 
full advantage of its assets without engaging in a merger. The failing company doctrine 
and the Court's decision in United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974), 
probably reflect this fact. Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising that a court that has 
developed the toe-hold merger doctrine in the conglomerate area should not have created 
some analogue for horizontal merger cases - though the judges' "need" for such a doctrine 
has clearly been reduced by their failure to recognize the possibility that horizontal merg-
ers that create efficiencies may actually increase competition in comparison with the 
status quo. I should note that I do doubt that the Clayton Act authorizes such nonstatus 
quo comparisons: doctrines like the toe-hold merger doctrine come close to imposing a 
novel duty on business firms to increase competition under a statute which seems to 
condemn only behavior that decreases competition in comparison with the status quo. 
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through a method that does not presuppose the definition of any 
relevant "markets." 
1. The Possible Competitive Impacts of Horizontal Mergers: A 
Summary 
This section will summarize (1) the ways a horizontal merger 
that generates no static or dynamic efficiencies67 can affect price 
and QV investment competition and (2) the ways any static or 
dynamic efficiencies a merger does generate may affect its com-
petitive impact. A horizontal merger that generates no efficien-
cies will tend to increase the BCAs, the natural OMs, and the 
contrived OMs of the merger partners (MPl and MP2) by reduc-
ing the attractiveness of the rival offers against which the MPs 
must compete. First, such a horizontal merger will tend to in-
crease the MPs' BCAs to the extent that they were each other's 
closest competitors for the patronage of particular buyers: in par-
ticular, such a merger will increase the best-placed MP's BCA by 
an amount equal to the second-best-placed MP's advantage over 
the third-best-placed suppliers of the buyers in question. Second, 
by raising their BCAs, a horizontal merger will increase the_MPs' 
ability to obtain OMs naturally by increasing the probability that 
they will find it profitable in the short run to beat an inferior 
rival's underbid. Third, a horizontal merger will increase the 
MPs' contrived OMs: (1) by reducing the communication costs 
they must incur to contrive an OM·(by obviating their communi-
cating with each other and permitting both to communicate in 
one act to a given rival) and by increasing the extent to which one 
partner can rely on its pricing decisions to communicate implic-
itly its anti~competitive intentions (when one of the merger part-
ners has a reputation that the other lacks for contriving or for 
accurately assessing its position); (2) by increasing the merger 
partners' ability to detect undercutting by using repeat sales re-
cords to predict the probability that any given percentage of their 
customers would have defected spontaneously (by increasing the 
number of customers they, serve, particularly when some rivals 
might otherwise have undercut both merger partners); (3) by 
67. An efficiency is said to be "static" if it does not relate specifically to the reievant 
firm's ability to grow. Thus, a merger that reduced a firm's marginal cost curve would be 
said to have generated a static efficiency. An efficiency is said to be "dynamic" if it relates 
specifically to the firm's ability to grow. Thus, a merger that created a new firm that would 
find it more profitable to introduce an additional product variant than either of its prede-
cessors would be said to have generated a dynamic efficiency. 
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increasing their ability to identify their undercutters (by elimi-
nating one possible undercutter, by providing them with more 
relevant circumstantial evidence through facilitating the pooling 
of their sales records, and perhaps by enabling the merger part-
ners to pool other sorts of information that would give them a 
more accurate picture of their individual rivals' competitive posi-
tions relative to them); ( 4) by increasing the credibility of their 
threats and promises (by enabling the merged company to take 
advantage of the stronger reputation of one of its predecessors and 
by increasing the actual profitability of retaliation and reciproca-
tion); (5) by reducing the cost of the necessary rewards and pun-
ishments by enabling the merged firm to use any excess recipro-
catory power either merger partner had vis-a-vis a particular 
rival, by increasing each MP's reciprocatory power (where one 
MP was some R's closest rival and the other MP was that R's 
second-closest rival), and by enabling the merged company to use 
both merger partners' products to punish a rival for undercutting 
either merger partner (where the MPs face different harm in-
flicted to cost-incurred ratios for their marginal [last necessary] 
acts of retaliation); and (6) by increasing the benefits generated 
by such behavior by increasing the BCAs the merger partners 
have to protect against undercutting and enabling both to profit 
from any reputation that either's reciprocation or retaliation 
would create. 
In fact, a horizontal merger that generates no efficiencies will 
also tend to increase the competitive advantages and contrived 
OMs of the MPs' rivals. Thus, to the extent that the horizontal 
merger increases the MPs' BCAs and OMs, it will tend to increase 
their rivals' overall competitive advantages (OCAs - which in-
clude their contextqal cost advantages) by increasing the prices 
the MPs charge their own customers, the discriminatory charac-
ter of the prices they would have to charge the Rs' customers to 
steal them, and hence the contextual costs the MPs would have 
to incur to undercut their rivals. Moreover, as we have seen, any 
such increase in the Rs' OCAs will also facilitate their obtaining 
natural OMs. Finally, and most importantly, the MPs' horizontal 
merger will increase their Rs' ability to contrive OMs in various 
ways. For example, in individualized pricing situations, 08 a hori-
zontal merger will tend to increase the contrived OMs of the 
68. Although space does not permit, similar points could be developed for across-the-
board pricing situations. See Horizontal Mergers, supra note 11, at 637-58. 
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merger partners' rivals (1) by reducing the costs to them of mak-
ing the necessary communications (by enabling such rivals to 
communicate simultaneously to both merger partners); (2) by 
reducing the costs they m~st incur to identify their undercutters 
(by reducing by one the number of independent possibilities and 
by enabling them to pool information ~bout the customers they 
lost that either MP was well-placed to steal); and (3) by reducing 
the cost to them of rewarding or punishing the merged firm (by 
enabling them to take advantage of any excess reciprocatory 
power they had in relation to one of the merger partners, by 
enabling them to punish the merged company by stealing more 
of one of the merger partners' customers than would otherwise 
have been necessary- i.e., by spreading the MPs' defenses, and 
by increasing the individual MPs' BCAs and hence vulnerability 
to retaliation). Although these effects of the MP1-MP2 merger on 
the competitive advantages and oligopolistic margins of their ri-
vals would not be relevant under my reading of the Sherman Act, 
they would be relevant under my interpretation of the Clayton 
Act. 
Horizontal mergers that do not generate efficiencies may also 
affect the intensity of QV investment competition.69 As we saw, 
the intensity of QV investment competition is defined in terms 
of the lower of the total ( 1rn + R + S + L) E + M* barriers and 
disincentives facing the best-placed potential expander at the 
entry-precluded expansion-barring QV investment level and the 
total (1rn+ R + S + L)N barriers facing the best-placed potential 
competitor at the entry-precluded QV investment level. Where 
the established firms are unable to take advantage of the invest-
ment restriction opportunities the barriers to entry create -
i.e., where the relevant (1rn + R + S + L)E + M* is less than 
the ( 1r D + R + S + L) N - a horizontal merger may reduce the 
intensity of QV investment competition in four primary ways: (1) 
by raising the relevant (-1r D + R) barriers where one of the MPs 
was the original best-placed expander and he finds it optimal to 
allocate to consolidating the merger resources that he would oth-
erwise use for internal growth; (2) by raising the relevant L bar-
rier where one of the MPs was the original best-placed expander 
and the merger increases his vulnerability to retaliation by allow-
ing his rivals to injure him by stealing his merger partner's cus-
tomers; (3) by raising the relevant L barrier where one of the MPs' 
69. For a more complete discussion of these possibilities and an analysis of some 
perverse results, see id. at 680-82. 
606 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:567 
rivals R was originally the best-placed expander and the merger 
increases the MPs' ability to retaliate against R's expansion by 
internalizing to the new concern the benefits MPl's retaliation 
would generate for MP2 (by deterring future QV investments) and 
by facilitating joint retaliation by both; and (4) by raising the 
relevant M* where one of the MPs was originally the best-placed 
expander and his intended expansion would reduce his partner's 
returns. On the other hand, where potential competition was 
effective, i.e., where the relevant ( 1r D + R + S + L)N is less than 
( 1r D + R + S + L)E + M*, a horizontal merger may also decrease 
QV investment competition by raising~ (by internalizing to the 
new firm the benefits MPl's retaliation generates for MP2 and by 
facilitating their joint retaliation). 
In short, horizontal mergers that generate no efficiencies will 
reduce price and QV investment competition both by internaliz-
ing to the merged firm the damage each MP's price or QV invest-
ment moves do to the other (and thereby increasing the MPs' 
BCAs and M disincentives) and by facilitating oligopolistic inter-
actions between the MPs and their Rs (and thereby increasing the 
natural and contrived OMs the MPs and their Rs can obtain as 
well as the L barriers the MPs and their Rs face). 
'Let us now analyze the competitive significance of any effi-
ciencies the horizontal merger might create. Most judicial discus-
sions of such efficiencies assume that their tendency is anti-
competitive70 while most academic discussions ignore their possi-
ble impact.71 Admittedly, a horizontal merger that generates 
70. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). But see William-
son, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 699 (1977). 
71. For example, the Williamson trade-off analysis ignores the impact of merger-
generated efficiencies both on the prices charged to buyers the merged firm does not obtain 
and on the intensity of QV investment competition. See Williamson, Economies as an 
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Off, 58 AM. EcoN. REv. 18 (1968). In part, this 
failure of antitrust analysts to work through the competitive consequences of efficiencies 
reflects their doubt (which Bork seems to share) about the feasibility of demonstrating 
the existence of such efficiencies in a litigative context. See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 219-
22. In fact, if! am correct in assuming that most of the efficiencies mergers generate reflect 
nonscale complementarities, problems of proof will be even worse than was previously 
supposed (since engineering studies of economies of scale will be relevant). In this note, I 
will propose a technique that will enable the government to make the ultimate merger 
decision depend on such efficiencies without requiring judges or administrators to esti-
mate their magnitude (although it will still be necesary for them to determine the charac-
ter of the relevant efficiencies - i.e., whether they are marginal or fixed, static or dy-
namic). 
The basic approach is familiar to all economists: a merger license fee that would 
resemble in some respects a pollution tax or license. In particular, the merger fee would 
be designed to guarantee the pro-competitive impact (or alternatively, the allocative 
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static efficiencies may decrease QV investment and hence price 
competition in the long run by inducing the exit of an established 
firm or deterring the entry of a potential competitor. In particu-
lar, this will be the result if'.the efficiency-generated improvement 
in the competitive position of the merged firm reduces by a criti-
cal amount the number of customers the established firm (best-
placed potential entrant) is (would be) best-placed to obtain or 
the size of the average competitive advantage it enjoys when best-
placed. In general, however, the immediate pro-competitive con-
efficiency) of any merger whose participants were willing to pay the fee they were charged. 
Unfortunately, it will be even more complicated to calculate the relevant merger fee than 
to calculate the appropriate pollution tax. In this note, I can simply delineate the general 
outline of the method that would have to be used. First, one would estimate the private 
profitability and the competitive impact of the relevant merger on the assumption that it 
would generate no efficiencies. Second, one would gather evidence on the character of the 
efficiencies in order to assess the ratio of their private value to their competitive value .. 
To see why such information is relevant, note that a static fixed cost efficiency that will 
not carry over to an expansion will have no competitive value (value to the relevant 
consumers) though it will have considerable private value, while a static marginal effi-
ciency that will affect the MPs' position primarily in their relations with customers whom 
they were originally second-best-placed to serve will have far more competitive value than 
private value (since it will reduce the prices these buyers pay even where the MPs do not 
end up supplying them by decreasing their best-placed suppliers' OCAs). See also note 
107 infra. Third, one would estimate this private value to competitive value ratio by 
combining one's conclusions about the character of the efficiencies in question with other 
data that are relevant for this purpose. For example, as the preceding discussion implies, 
in the case of marginal static efficiencies one would want to know the relative frequency 
with which the MPs were best-placed, second-best-placed, and close-to-second-best-
placed. Finally, one would use the results generated in this fashion to calculate the merger 
fee that would guarantee that the decision that would be most privately profitable for the 
MPs would also be most pro-competitive. 
A numerical example might be useful. Assume that one had reached the following 
two conclusions: (1) absent any efficiencies, the relevant merger would decrease competi-
tion by two million dollars and would generate eight hundred thousand dollars profit for 
its participants; (2) the ratio of the competitive value of the efficiencies the merger would 
generate to the profits they would yield the MPs was two to one. These facts imply that 
the merger would be pro-competitive only if it yielded efficiencies that were worth more 
than one million dollars to its participants - since only then would the competitive value 
of the efficiencies exceed the two million dollar competitive loss the merger would have 
generated absent the efficiencies in question. The public fee-setter would therefore set the 
merger fee at $1,800,000, .since the MPs would be willing to pay that fee only if they 
expected the merger to generate efficiencies that were worth at least one million dollars 
to them. 
I should also note that a perfectly analogous method could be used if one's goal was 
to increase allocative efficiency. Two changes would be necessary. First, one would have 
to substitute in step one a calculation of the amount by which the merger would misallo-
cate resources if it did not generate efficiencies for the original estimate of the amount by 
which it would reduce competition in such circumstances. Second, one would calculate 
in step three the ratio of the allocative value of the relevant efficiencies to their private 
value to the MPs rather than the competitive value/private MP value ratio described 
above. 
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sequences of such changes in position are likely to prevail. Thus, 
a merger that improves the MPs' competitive position by generat-
ing a static efficiency (e.g., by reducing its marginal cost) will 
tend to increase competition by reducing the Rs' BCAs whenever 
the relevant MP either was second-best-placed or was worse-
than-second-best-placed by less than the efficiency in question. 
Moreover,- any tendency such an efficiency has to reduce the Rs' 
BCA will also reduce the Rs' ability to obtain OMs naturally 
as well as the OCAs and contrived OMs the MPs enjoy or obtain. 
Finally, even if the efficiency does not lessen any R's BCA, it 
might diminish its contrived OM by allowing the merged firm 
to profit from undercutting an oligopolistic price the R might 
otherwise have contrived to obtain. Similarly, a merger that re-
duced the 'II'nbarrier the merged company faced (e.g., by combin-
ing an MP with excess managerial capacity in its production 
department with an MP with excess capacity in distribution) 
would tend to increase the intensity of QV investment competi-
tion72 by reducing the 'lt'n barrier73 and perhaps the M disincen-
tives74 facing the established firm that would be best-placed to 
expand the market's QV investment if entry were precluded. 
Accordingly, the net competitive effect of any horizontal 
merger will depend on whether its tendency to generate static and 
dynamic efficiencies that will increase the competitive pressure 
the MPs place on their rivals outweighs its tendency to reduce 
such competition by internalizing to the merged firm the damage 
its predecessors' price and QV investment moves previously in-
flicted on each other as well as by facilitating various contrived 
and actual oligopolistic interactions between the MPs and their 
Rs. 
72. Assuming that potential competition is ineffective. 
73. Assuming that one of the MPs was originally the relevant best-placed expander 
or that he originally faced barriers that exceeded those confronting the relevant best-
placed expander by less than the efficiencies the merger would generate. 
74. Assume, for example, that a rival of the MPs was originally the only firm that 
was not deterred from expanding by the (1rn + R + S + L)E barriers it faced and that 
this R -was deterred froni expanding by the M disincentives it originally confronted, By 
reducing the 1rn. barriers the merged firm faced, the merger might eliminate the M 
disincentives confronting the R by guaranteeing that the merged firm would expand if tho 
R did not. Admittedly, perverse results are also possible in this context. Thus, when tho 
R in question originally would have expanded despite th!:) M disincentives he faced, tho 
merger might deter his expansion by creating a situation in which both ho and tho merged 
firm faced higher (natural) oligopolistic disincentives. Alternatively, such a dynamic effi-
ciency might tend to reduce competition by inducing the merged company to prevent 
entry by expanding in a situation in which entry would otherwise have occurred. However, 
I am confident that both these perverse results are less likely than tho pro-competitive 
effect described in the text. 
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2. A Critique of the Market-Oriented Approach to Merger 
Analysis 
As we have seen, Bork follows the universal tradition of pre-
dicting the competitive consequences of horizontal mergers from 
the MPs' market shares and their market's concentration. This 
section will explain the preferability of an alternative that would 
not require any "relevant market" to be defined. 
The undesirability of the traditional approach partially re-
flects the inability of market-share data to reveal much about a 
large number of highly relevant factors to which it does not even 
purport to relate. Thus, market shares have little bearing on (1) 
the potentially pro-competitive efficiencies the merger will gener-
ate, (2) many determinants of the effectiveness of potential com-
petition (e.g., the growth rate of market demand), and (3) many 
reputational, informational, and other factors (e.g., the stability 
of buyer preferences through time or the strategic and mechanical 
costs of changing an operational price) that affect the ability of 
the relevant sellers to obtain natural or contrived oligopolistic 
margins. Of course, if this were the traditional approach's sole 
failing, market share and concentration data could continue to 
play a crucial role in the analysis of the legality of horizontal 
mergers; one could simply amend the traditional approach by 
adjusting the various combinations of market shares and concen-
tration levels that condemn a horizontal merger to reflect the 
value of the significant factors to which traditional market-share 
data is insensitive. 
However, a far more radical departure is required. In particu-
lar, the market-oriented approach must be totally rejected, be-
cause in our monopolistically competitive world, market share 
and concentration data do not even tell us much about the factors 
to which they supposedly do relate. More specifically, the 
market-oriented approach fails because data on the merger part-
ners' market shares and on the concentration of the relevant 
markets do not predict well such matters as (1) how often the 
merger partners were each other's closest competitors, (2) the size 
of the second-best-placed merger partner's OCA over the third-
best-placed supplier of the relevant buyers, (3) how ·often the 
merger partners were close to being each other's closest competi-
tors, ( 4) how often the merger partners were or were close to being 
their various other rivals' closest competitors, (5) how often and 
to what extent either merger partner was a close competitor of one 
of its rivals significantly less often than vice versa, (6) to what 
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extent (in the above cases) the other merger partner was a close 
competitor of that rival more often than vice versa, (7) how many 
firms could undercut any given contrived OM that the market's 
various sellers might charge, (8) to what extent a retaliating 
merger partner was its partner's close competitor less often than 
were the firms whose undercutting its retaliation would deter, (9) 
to what extent an undermining across-the-board price or new QV 
investment would harm some products or outlets dispropor-
tionately more than others, and (10) the probability that one or 
both MPs would have been best-placed to expand their market's 
QV investment beyond what would otherwise be its equilibrium 
level. At least in part, the inability of such market-aggregated 
data to predict these determinants of the impact of horizontal 
mergers reflects the product and locational differentiation that 
are the defining characteristics of our monopolistically competi-
tive world - viz., reflects the facts that in such a world, even 
when there is a clear break in the chain of competitors (so that 
markets can be defined in a nonarbitrary way), (1) some firms 
outside the associated market will be able to compete for some 
of its buyers, (2) various firms within the market will not be 
universally or equally competitive with each other, and (3) differ-
ent firms in the same market, and a fortiori in different markets, 
will have very different distributions of competitive ranks, advan-
tages, and disadvantages. 75 
75. It should now be possible to explain why mergers between firms with more than 
70% of some market may not d~crease competition while mergers between firms with 
relatively low market shares may decrease it- i.e., why Bork's particular market-oriented 
predictions are likely to be incorrect. In what follows, I will assume that we are dealing 
with cases in which there is some nonarbitrary way to define the relevant markets .:._ that 
there is, for example, a break in the chain of competitors that permits one to isolate groups 
of suppliers who are far more competitive with each other than with anyone else. Even 
on this assumption; a merger between firms that have 70% of the relevant market may 
not be anticompetitive. Thus, such a merger may not increase the merger partners' BCAs 
(and derivatively their natural OMs and their Rs' OCAs) since the MPs may almost never 
be each other's closest competitors. This result could obtain either because the MPs were 
almost never second-best-placed (because, for example, both MPs produced highly differ• 
entiated products whose buyers had strong preferences for the product of their favored MP 
over that of the other so that each MP's closest rival was almost always the producer of a 
cheaper, nondifferentiated good) or because the MPs were less competitive with each other 
than with other firms in the market. (This condition is not inconsistent with our market 
definition. Thus, the MPs might still be more competitive with each other than with 
anyone outside the market. Alternatively, the MPs might both be quite competitive with 
one or more common independent rivals.) 
Nor is there any reason to believe that such a merger will increase the merger part• 
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ners' natural oligopolistic margins since, for example, it may not increase their BCAs, may 
not yield any relevant economies of scale and may not significantly improve· the MPs' 
ability to initiate a series of premature price announcements. Moreover, for two reasons, 
such a merger may also not increase the MPs' contrived OMs. First, such a merger may 
not increase the profitability of contriving OMs: in particular, such a merger will not 
facilitate contrived oligopolistic pricing if the MPs were never close to being each other's 
closest competitors; if they already have sufficient customers to identify their undercut-
ters from repeat sales records; if they have different close rivals; if they have no excess 
reciprocal power; and if they have similar harm inflicted to cost-incurred ratios for their 
respective marginal necessary acts of retaliation against any given rival. Second, contrived 
oligopolistic pricing may have been sufficiently unprofitable pre-merger for such MPs to 
make any merger-related increase in its profitability inconsequential: thus, even in con-
centrated markets contrived oligopolistic pricing will be unprofitable if the MPs have 
always been confronted with a large number of equally well-placed "closest" rivals - viz., 
members of a competitive fringe that are second-best-placed far more than they are best-
placed; if the incidence of taste changes varies sufficiently through time to preclude the 
drawing of any reliable inferences from repeat sales records; if the MPs rarely are each 
other's closest rivals; and if the MPs' closest rivals enjoy very small BCAs. For similar 
reasons, a horizontal merger between firms with 70% of the market may not increase the 
size of the MPs' Rs' contrived OMs. 
Finally, such a merger may also not reduce the intensity of QV investment competi-
tion. Thus, since as we have already suggested, such a merger may not reduce the cost of 
retaliation, it may not increase the prevailing L barriers. Certainly, there is no reason to 
believe that such a merger will inevitably increase the (,r/0 + R) barriers the MPs face 
by inducing the merged firm to allocate to consolidating the merger managers who could 
otherwise have been used to supervise an expansion; and even if it does, such an increase 
will have no significance where potential competition is effective or some other established 
firm would have been better placed to expand in any case. Similarly, such a merger will 
also not reduce QV investment by increasing M where some other potential or established 
rival is better placed to increase the market's QV investment to or beyond its original level 
and/or where the MPs can introduce new projects that are largely uncompetitive with their 
old. 
Thus, the fact that a merger involves firms with 70% of the market does not guarantee 
its having any significant tendency to reduce competition. Indeed, where such a merger 
does have such a tendency, the fact that the MPs have large market shares is not inconsis-
tent with its producing a sufficient amount of static and dynamic efficiencies to give it a 
net pro-competitive impact: once it is recognized that most of the efficiencies that mergers 
generate arise from the combination of assets that are complementary for nonscale rea-
sons, there is no reason to suppose that mergers between large firms with high market 
shares will be significantly less likely to generate such economies. Accordingly, Bork's 
conclusion that mergers between firms with 70% of the market will tend to reduce the 
intensity of competition is simply not justified. 
For analogous reasons, I would also not assume that a merger between relatively 
small firms will not have a net anti-competitive impact. Thus, such a merger will increase 
the MPs' BCAs where the MPs are often each other's closest competitors - because they 
are second-best-placed far more often than they are best-placed and/or because they are 
more competitive with each other than with most other firms in the market in question. 
Moreover, for a variety of reasons, such a merger may increase the MPs' contrived 
OMs: in particular, such a merger can facilitate contrived oligopolistic pricing in a number 
of circumstances - e.g., where the MPs would often have been sufficiently well-placed 
to undercut each other's OMs, where the information pooling that the merger permits 
increases their ability to detect undercutting and identify their undercutter from their 
repeat sales records (because their original sales are too low, because the same rivals are 
well-placed to undercut each, and because each has different important information about 
the appeal of some rivals' products), where one of the MPs has excess· reciprocal power in 
his dealings with a close rival of the other MP, or where the two MPs have different harm 
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Accordingly, I believe that predictions of the competitive 
effect of horizontal mergers should be based on direct estimates 
of the factors I have described. The direct method may not even 
be much more expensive: the market-oriented approach already 
requires one to make crude estimates of much of the data I have 
described in order to define the relevant markets, and my ap-
proach obviates deciding which set of market definitions is most 
appropriate - a task that consumes an extraordinary amount of 
resources to produce aggregate figures with less predictive value 
than the disaggregated data from which they are derived. Even 
if the optimal version of the nonaggregated approach is more 
expensive than the traditional market-oriented procedure, its 
inflicted to cost-incurred ratios for their marginal necessary acts of retaliation against the 
same rival. Moreover, any such increase in the profitability of contrived oligopolistic 
pricing may have practical significance since even small firms in unconcentrated markets 
may find it profitable to contrive oligopolistic prices (because only a few of their rivals 
would be able to undercut such prices, because the percentage of spontaneous defections 
is stable through time, because each seller has a large number of small buyers, because 
each R has significant BCAs that make it vulnerable to retaliation, etc.). Similarly, n 
merger between firms with low market shares might increase the MP's Ra' contrived OMs 
(because both tended to be well-placed to steal the customers of the same Ra, because 
some R had a lower harm-inflicted-to-cost-incurred ratio for the marginal necessary net 
of retaliation against MPl than against MP2). 
Moreover, since BCAs may be higher in an i.mconcentrated market in which differen-
tiated products are produced than in a concentrated market in which a homogeneous 
product is produced and since a QV investment may have a concentrated impact within 
an unconcentrated market, a horizontal merger that enables two small firms to pool their 
power against some QV investor may also decrease QV investment competition by increas-
ing some relevant L barrier. In addition, since small firms may be better placed to expand 
than their larger rivals, may operate in markets in which potential competition is ineffec-
tive, may have to allocate scarce managerial talent to consolidating their merger, and may 
be less able to introduce new variants or outlets that are less-than-typically competitive 
with their previous projects, mergers between small firms may also reduce QV investment 
competition by raising the critical (,r0 + R) barrier or M disincentive. Finally, since the 
fact that a merger involves small fll'IIls in an unconcentrated market does not guarantee 
its efficiency, as Bork assumes, R. Boruc, supra note 1, at 219, any anti-competitive 
tendency such a merger has may result in its being anti-competitive on balance. (Because 
Professor Bork assumes that mergers between small firms in unconcentrated markets 
cannot reduce competition, he concludes that they must be motivated by n desire to 
achieve efficiencies (or to take advantage of tax gimmicks). Since, as we have seen, such 
mergers can reduce competition, Bork's conclusion about their probable efficiency is un-
warranted.) 
In short, I believe that a detailed analysis of the factors that determine the competi-
tive impact of a horizontal merger suggests that the correlation between the market shores 
of the MPs and the concentration of their market, on the one hand, and the competitive 
impact of their merger, on the other, is too low to justify Bork's rule. Indeed, in our 
monopolistically competitive world, I would not even establish n presumption that high 
market share mergers in concentrated markets are anti-competitive or that low-mnrket-
share mergers in unconcentrated markets are not. Unfortunately, I see no useful way to 
avoid the kind of case-by-case analysis my nonaggregated approach entails. 
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greater accuracy would more than justify the additional cost. 
Although reasonable persons can certainly disagree about which 
of the above factors should be estimated and how precisely, I 
am confident that some more or less refined version of the non-
aggregated approach I have described will be more cost-effective 
than any possible market-oriented approach. 
E. Monopoly and Monopolization 
Three basic issues arise under this heading: (1) how does one 
tell whether a firm possesses monopoly power (inter alia, what is 
the relationship between a firm's market share and its monopoly 
power); (2) what is the legal significance of a firm's possessing 
monopoly power under a proper interpretation of section 2's rule 
that no person "shall monopolize"; and (3) on policy grounds, 
should one break up firms that have monopoly power. 
1. The Relationship Between Market Share and Monopoly 
Power 
Although Professor Bork is clearly dissatisfied with the tradi-
tional equation of monopoly power with high market shares, he 
does not address this issue directly.76 In fact, the correlation be-
tween monopoly power and market share is almost certainly too 
low to permit an inference of the former from the latter. 77 In my 
opinion, a firm's monopoly power should be defined in terms of 
its competitive advantages and the lower of (a) the barriers to 
entry facing its best-placed potential competitor or (b) the bar-
riers to expansion and monopolistic investment disincentives fac-
ing the established rival who would be best placed to expand QV 
investment in the relevant "market" if entry were precluded. On 
this definition, a firm's monopoly power will reflect its ability to 
charge supracompetitive prices and to earn supracompetitive re-
turns on its most profitable projects without taking advantage of 
any kind of oligopolistic interdependence. If one accepts this defi-
nition ( which does correspond to the general way courts have 
defined monopoly power),78 one clearly will not be able to predict 
76. In fact, Bork does not analyze monopoly power and oligopoly power separately. 
77. The last section explained inter alia why the ability of firms in different markets 
to engage in various oligopolistic interactions probably is not highly correlated with their 
market's concentration or their own market shares. This section explains why the monop-
oly power of firms in different industries will not correlate highly with their respective 
market shares. 
78. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 
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a firm's monopoly power from its market share. Thus, a firm's 
market share - which reflects the frequency with which it is best 
placed - will have little bearing on its competitive advantages 
- which equal the amount by which it is best placed. Indeed, 
at one extreme, one can imagine a firm with 100% of its market 
and virtually no BCAs at all. This result might occur, for ex-
ample, if the relevant firm was always only slightly better placed 
than a "closest rival" that sold the same product in a different 
geographic market or that produced a different product through 
a process that could be immediately converted to produce a 
competitive good. At the other extreme, one can imagine a 
firm with a low market share in an o~timally defined market 
that did enjoy substantial BCAs when dealing for the patronage 
of particular buyers who had a strong preference for its product 
or distributive variant. Of course, these extreme cases do not 
demonstrate the weakness of the correlation between market 
shares and BCAs, but they do suggest why it may be dangerous 
to predict a firm's BCAs from its market share. In fact, there is 
even less reason to believe that a firm's market share will have 
much bearing on its actual and potential rivals' barriers to expan-
sion and entry. Although firms which maintain high shares of 
growing markets probably do face lower QV investment barriers 
than their established and potential competitors,79 this correla-
tion has little bearing on the absolute height of the barriers facing 
their rivals. In short, I doubt there is much inter-market correla-
tion between a firm's market share and monopoly power. Even if 
this view is too pessimistic, the market-oriented approach to pre-
dicting a firm's monopoly power would be liable to the same 
criticism as its horizontal merger counterpart: it would clearly be 
more accurate and might even be cheaper to estimate BCAs, 
entry barriers, expansion barriers, and investment disincentives 
directly than to try to predict the firm's monopoly power by col-
lecting data to define a relevant market and then predicting the 
firm's monopoly power from market share figures that lose much 
of the value of the nonaggregated data on which the market defi-
nition was based. Obviously, this result has substantial implica-
(1956): "Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition," My 
definition focuses on the extent of a firm's nonoligopolistic control over prices and QV 
investment. 
79. As we shall see, an established seller who is worse placed than some rival to make 
a QV investment the latter finds only marginally profitable may still find it profitable to 
make the investment in question if his expansion would do less damage to his pre-existing 
capital than the rival investment it deters. See text at note 84 infra. 
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tions for the drafting of any new deconcentration legislation as 
well as for the interpretation of any current antitrust provision 
that is held to make possession of monopoly power an element of 
an antitrust offense. 
2. The Relationship Between Monopoly Power and a Section 2 
Offense 
As Bork shows, 80 the courts - and indeed individual judicial 
opinions - have waffled among three interpretations of the Sher-
man Act's command that "no person shall monopolize." Accord-
ing to the most stringent version of this command, section 2 pro-
hibits the possession of monopoly power; according to the least 
stringent version, section 2 prohibits the possession of monopoly 
power only if it has been achieved through conduct that would 
itself constitute a Sherman Act violation; and finally, according 
to Judge Wyzanski's intermediate version, although section 2 
does not prohibit monopoly power obtained through legitimate 
business skill (i.e., through "allocative efficiency"), it does con-
demn monopoly in some cases in which no behavioral violations 
of the Act have occurred - viz., where the monopoly grew from 
neither business skill nor behavioral violations but from some 
"practice which without being predatory, abusive, or coercive was 
in economic effect exclusionary. " 81 
Professor Bork argues for the least stringent interpretation-of 
section 2. Although Bork's policy argument for this interpretation 
is not entirely convincing since the allocative efficiency of much 
of the behavior on which judges have focused is far more ambigu-
ous than Bork maintains, his interpretation is more compatible 
with the fact that the Act does condemn "monopolization" and 
not "monopoly." Moreover, this linguistic argument is confirmed 
by the greater compatibility of the least stringent interpretation 
with the structure of American regulatory policy - which recog-
nizes and protects (for example, through patent laws) the right 
of individuals to improve the demand-cost combination they face 
by reducing their costs or improving their products as w~ll as 
their right to exploit any such position. On these grounds, then, 
I share Bork's preference for the least restrictive interpretation of 
section 2. However, I agree neither with Bork's independent criti-
80. See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 164-75. 
81. See id. at 171 (quoting Judge Wyzanski's opinion in United States v. United Shoe 
Mach., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953)). 
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cism of Wyzanski's intermediate test nor with Bork's analysis of 
the legality of many of the practices at issue in major section 2 
cases. As we have seen, Wyzanski focused on the intermediate 
case of monopolies caused by behavior that was neither predatory 
nor allocatively efficient. Bork dismisses Wyzanski's contention 
that such monopolies violate section 2 on the ground that it deals 
with an empty legal box - i.e., that profitable business behavior 
must be either anti-competitive (violate the Sherman Act) or 
allocatively efficient. However, this contention is simply incor-
rect. In general, a firm may find particular behavior profitable for 
three different reasons: (1) because it reduces the attractiveness 
of the rival offers against which it must compete (because it is 
anti-competitive); (2) because it improves the demand-cost posi-
tion of the firm by reducing its costs or changing the character of 
its product (because it is presumptively allocatively efficient); or 
(3) because it helps the firm to exploit a given demand-cost posi-
tion. Unfortunately, as Wyzanski's analysis implies, practices 
that function in the third way may well be allocatively inefficient 
even though they are privately profitable. Thus, as we shall see 
in Part F, various kinds of pricing strategies (such as price dis-
crimination and transaction-surplus-saving supramarginal-cost 
price-shifting tie-ins) can misallocate resources while they in-
crease their employers' profits by raising their ability to convert 
buyer into seller surplus. Moreover, although· this result is prob-
ably atypical, such practices may occasionally produce the anti-
competitive relult Wyzanski fears - i.e., may lead some rival to 
exit by making it profitable in the short run for their user to off er 
better terms to buyers who otherwise would have patronized the 
rivals in question.82 However, even when they do, I reject Wyzan-
ski's assumption that the resulting monopoly violates the Sher-
man Act on the ground that our legal system's recognition of the 
right to innovate (reduce costs and change products) implies the 
legitimacy of attempts to exploit the more favorable demand-cost 
position thereby achieved.83 In short, Wyzanski's legal box is mis-
analyzed, not empty (as Bork supposes). 
Moreover, although Wyzanski's functional classification of 
business conduct (e.g., of the ten-year leases United Shoe em-
ployed) is often highly debatable, Bork too readily assumes the 
82. Note that, on my interpretation, such an act would not violate the Sherman Act 
since its profitability would not depend on its inducing the relevant rival to exit. 
83. Indeed, as I have already suggested, I would even qualify the Clayton Act's 
competitive impact test to reflect this judgment. 
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allocative efficiency of the various types of behavior that has led 
judges to condemn particular monopolies. In fact, the character 
of even such apparently desirable behavior as Alcoa's eager em-
bracing of every investment opportunity84 is highly ambiguous. 
To see why, let's exa.mine United Shoe's ten-year leases. United's 
ten-year lease may simply have been an efficient method of insur-
ing that its product reputation would not be damaged by im-
proper servicing, of supplying its customers (shoe manufacturers) 
with capital, and of shifting risk from them to United. On this 
account, the fact that United's customers could save relatively 
little money by ;retµrning the machines early would reflect the 
fact that much of the "-rent" paid in later years was really a 
repayment of the loan United supplied by undercharging them in 
early years. On the other hand, particularly if United arranged 
new leases with its customers well before the expiration of its 
old, the loans might have been a form of predatory pricing 
directed at potential entrants. On this account, United's loans 
would have conveyed a bribe (in the form of a reduced rent) to 
its customers conditional on their committing themselves to 
United - i.e., conditional on their agreeing to terms that would 
have made it far less attractive for them to shift their patronage 
to a new entrant. Although the resulting increase in the barriers 
to entry might have been disadvantageous to United's customers 
as a group, the cost to United of securing this advantage may well 
have been minimal. Thus, although each of its customers might 
have required a large payment for its commitment if its refusal 
would have bound all other buyers to follow its example, each 
might be willing to succumb for a small payment if the survival 
of any new shoe equipment manufacturer depended on its obtain-
ing a large number of customers and each shoe manufacturer 
realized that its individual availability would not significantly 
affect a potential entrant's profit expectations. In other words, 
since a decision by any given customer to maintain its flexibility 
might provide a kind of public good for all ofUnited's customers, 
United might be able to purchase its customers' commitment 
cheaply. Clearly, such behavior would violate the Sherman Act 
(as I construe it) since its profitability would depend on its tend-
ency to reduce the attractiveness of the rival offers against which 
United had to compete. Of course, if the cost of determining 
whether such a bribe had actually been conveyed was high, a 
84. These expansions led Judge Learned Hand to condemn Alcoa's monopoly in 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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presumption of efficiency would be justified if the likelihood of 
such a predatory bribe were relatively low. I suspect that such 
bribes may be executed too often for this possibility to be ignored. 
In any case, I doubt that the cost of identifying such bribes would 
turn out to be prohibitive.85 
In short, the allocative efficiency and legal status of much of 
the behavior on which section 2 judges have focused is far more 
ambiguous than Bork maintains. I suspect -that Bork would not 
find this result entirely displeasing, since it would justify a rein-
terpretation of some landmark section 2 cases that would make 
them more compatible with the legal rule we both believe the 
Sherman Act contains. 
85. In fact, the character of even Alcoa's practice of "doubling and redoubling its 
capacity before others entered the field" could violate my interpretation of the Sherman 
Act. Although, obviously, Hand's opinion does not draw these distinctions, one could 
differentiate three categories of monopoly-producing, entry-deterring expansions: the first 
would contain all entry-deterring expansions that would have been profitable even if entry 
had been independently precluded - e.g., even if the investor faced the associated mon-
opolistic investment disincentives he would have confronted if there were no threat of 
entry. The second would include all entry-deterring expansions that would not have been 
profitable if the threat of entry had not eliminated the monopolistic investment disincen-
tives the investor would otherwise have faced - i.e., that would not have been profitable 
had they not deterred an entry that would have reduced the profits the investor realized 
on his pre-existing capital. Finally, the third would include any entry-deterring expansion 
whose profitability depended on its reducing the profits the investor realized on his pre-
existing projects less than they would have been reduced by the entry the expansion in 
question deterred - i.e., whose profitability depended on the monopolistic investment 
incentive the potential entrant created. It is clear to me that all expansions in this third 
category would violate my interpretation of the Sherman Act since their profitability 
depends on their reducing the attractiveness of the offers against which the investor's pre-
existing projects compete. In fact, a rule condemning such "reprehensible, anti-
competitive" expansions would even make good policy sense: the fact that the expansion's 
profitability depended on the expanding established firm's monopolistic incentives to 
expand implies that the deterred best-placed entrant ~as allocatively better placed than 
the expanding established firm to introduce a new QV investment into the market (since 
the entry would have been profitable even though the potential entrant had no monopolis-
tic incentive to enter.) 
Indeed, I can even imagine an argument that QV investments in the second category 
also violate my formulation of the Sherman Act since their profitability does depend on 
their reducing the attractiveness of the independent offers against which the expander 
must compete. In my opinion, however, this conclusion is not required by my verbal 
formulation and would condemn behavior that is in no sense reprehensible. Thus, a rule 
forbidding QV investments in category two would not make good policy sense since there 
is good reason to believe that the established firms which would make the QV investments 
in question would face barriers to expansion that were lower than the barriers to entry 
facing the deterred potential entrant - since the alternative conclusion would result in 
the relevant inve~tments being made by an allocatively worse-placed firm. 
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3. The Policy Grounds for Deconcentration 
As I have suggested, Bork believes not only that the antitrust 
laws do not condemn monopoly per se but also that a policy of 
deconcentrating industry would seriqusly misallocate resources. 
Bork's argument against the deconcentration proposals contains 
two major premises. First, he maintains that there is no 
"significant output restriction problem arising from the concen-
tration of any industry."86 And second, he contends that since 
"any size [a company] achieve[s] by internal growth without 
predation is the most efficient size for that firm," then "the disso-
lution of any such firm will always create an efficiency loss. "87 I 
have already explained why I disagree with Bork's first p:remise. 
I also disagree with his second, which takes a mistakenly static 
view of industrial efficiency. More particularly, I disagree with 
Bork's second premise because the efficiency of established firm 
expansions reflects their need to grow88 rather than to take advan-
tage of static economies of scale. If I am correct, it may be possi-
ble to require efficient expanders to divest some of their projects 
without reducing their operating efficiency. Admittedly, such a 
divestiture policy might artificially reduce the incentive of firms 
to invest in their original "market"89 and might even induce them 
to raise their prices90 or underinvest in cost-reducing innovation 
or product improvements.91 Nevertheless, a deconcentration pol-
icy directed at industries with higher-than-average DU/QV ratios 
(rather than at industries with high concentration levels) might 
still be allocatively justified by its ability to reduce inter-industry 
86. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 178. 
87. Id. at 194. 
88. As Edith Penrose has argued, firms need to grow in order to make full use of the 
increasing managerial talent at their disposal - increasing because, unlike most assets, 
the productive capacity of managers tends to increase through time - i.e., with experi-
ence. See E. PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM (1959). 
89. Even if a divestiture order would not affect the operating efficiency of a company, 
the transaction cost of selling a division would reduce the private returns of an expansion. 
A deconcentration policy would therefore create an artificial incentive for firms to diver-
sify. I should note, however, that this artificial incentive might be a useful offset to the 
monopolistic investment incentives that artificially increase the absolute and relative 
attractiveness of expanding in one's original markets (as opposed to diversifying). 
90. If the likelihood that a firm would be required to divest one or more of its projects 
increased with its market share, a firm might find it profitable to charge a price that 
exceeded the conventional profit-maximizing level in order to reduce its sales and market 
share. 
91. If the likelihood that a firm would be required to divest one or more of its projects 
increased with its BCAs and the barriers to entry and expansion its rivals faced, the 
divestiture policy would artificially reduce the relevant firm's incentive to increase its 
BCAs and the barriers in question. 
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and quantity-vs.-QV-investment misallocations.92 I should em-
phasize, however, (1) that the current deconcentration proposals 
- which focus on market shares and concentration - would be 
totally ill-suited for this purpose, (2) that QV investment misallo-
cation might better be handled through tax policy in any case, 93 
and (3) that reasonable persons certainly could conclude that the 
resource misallocation caused by legitimately obtained monopoly 
power cannot be reduced without generating prohibitive transac-
tion costs and misallocative incentive distortions. 
F. The Competitive Effect and Allocative Efficiency of Vertical 
Practices 
As I have suggested, Professor Bork analyzes accurately and 
comprehensibly many of the legitimate business functions of the 
various vertical practices to which the antitrust laws relate. This 
section will investigate his conclusion that such practices vir-
tually never reduce competition and always increase allocative 
efficiency. 
Two preliminary questions must be addressed before we can 
analyze the competitive effect of such vertical practices as resale 
price maintenance, vertical territorial restraints, price discrimi-
nation, tie-ins, and reciprocity: (1) are we to focus on the compet-
itive effect of an individual firm's use of these techniques or the 
competitive effect of a rule allowing all suppliers of some buyer 
or buyers to use them and (2) when analyzing a technique's com-
petitive effect, should we ask what behavior the parties will sub-
stitute for the behavior we contemplate forbidding. At times, the 
courts have concluded (1) that they should look to the competi-
tive effect of an individual firm's use of a technique and (2) that 
behavior that is anti-competitive compared with some alternative 
is not legal simply because the lawful behavior with which it will 
be replaced is even more anti-competitive. I disagree with both 
these positions. The first converts the courts into parimutuel 
handicappers by requiring them to forbicj more successful firms 
92. As we saw, such a policy would also be likely to reduce labor-leisure misallocation, 
present-vs.-future consumption misallocation, RUO misallocation among distant compet-
itors (since the relevant firms would probably have higher-than-average P/MC ratios), 
as well as various income-distribution misallocations. 
93. Thus, one could raise (lower) the effective tax rate on corporate profits in indus-
tries that would otherwise have a higher (lower)-than-average DU/QV ratio. Admittedly, 
such a policy would not generate the first three types of improvements listed in the 
previous footnote. However, these disadvantages might be outweighed by the difference 
between the transaction cost of administering such a statute and the sum of the transac-
tion costs and operating efficiency losses any divestiture order would generate. 
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from using profitable techniques that less successful firms may 
use. In brief, I find this objectionable both because it is incon-
sistent with the notion that firms that have lawfully obtained 
BCAs may enjoy their fruits and because it would require the 
courts to force firms to operate in an allocatively (as well as a 
privately) inefficient manner. The second is objectionable be-
cause it compels the courts to make decisions which clearly will 
have anti-competitive effects - in the face of the clear congres-
sional goal of increasing the intensity of competition. 
Bork's discussion of the competitive effect of vertical prac-
tices focuses on the leverage theory that the only function of such 
practices is to enable firms to use their ."monopoly power" in one 
market to obtain monopoly power in another. As Bork and many 
others have argued, this theory basically assumes that the mo-
nopolist can have his cake and eat it too - that the monopolist 
can use in a second market the monopoly power he enjoys in a 
first market without forfeiting his ability to use that power in the 
first as well. In reality, except in the trivial case in which the 
vertical practice functions by concealing predatory behavior, no 
vertical practice can have an anti-competitive effect unless its 
profitability does not depend on its reducing competition. Al-
though this conclusion implies that such practices cannot violate 
the Sherman Act, it leaves open the possibility that an individual 
vertical agreement or {preferably) the general availability of such 
agreements may violate the Clayton Act. In particular, such 
agreements may violate the Clayton Act as I construe it if they 
are less profitable for marginal established competitors or poten-
tial entrants than for well-established concerns and if their rela-
tive profitability does not reflect their relative allocative effi-
ciency when used by the firms in question. Although Bork is 
somewhat too complacent about this issue, his conclusion that 
such agreements do not violate the Clayton Act is undoubtedly 
generally correct - primarily because such agreements do not 
seem likely to favor well-established firms, but also because their 
profitability often reflects their allocative efficiency. 
However, I disagree with Bork's conclusion that virtually all 
such vertical practices are allocatively efficient. In part, my dis-
agreement derives from my rejection of the two premises that un-
derlie his method for predicting an event's allocative efficiency. 
In part, though, it reflects his failure to recognize (in this context 
as well) one of the major ways in which business practices can 
increase profits; i.e., that a business practice can increase profits 
not only by (1) creating business efficiencies and (2) by reducing 
622 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:567 
the competition the firm confronts but also, as Judge Wyzanski 
may have perceived, (3) by increasing its ability to exploit a given 
demand-marginal cost position (e.g., to convert buyer into seller 
surplus). Although I disagree with Wyzanski's assumption that 
such practices tend to reduce competition ("further the domi-
nance" of the firm), there is no reason to expect them to be 
allocatively efficient. 
Admittedly, many of the vertical practices Bork analyzes do 
generate business efficiencies. For example, resale price agree-
ments or vertical territorial restraints generate efficiencies when 
they increase the ability of firms to induce their distributors to 
offer pre-sales advice or post-sales service or to communicate 
their discoveries to each other. So do tying (reciprocity) agree-
ments that reduce the cost a seller (buyer) has to incur to deter 
its customers (supplier) from combining its product with pri-
vately and allocatively inferior complements (using inferior ingre-
dients). However, many vertical practices function exclusively in 
the third way just described. Thus, price discrimination and cer-
tain types of tie-ins function by increasing their employer's abil-
ity to take advantage of a given demand-marginal cost position. 
Since such practices probably do not promote allocative effi-
ciency in any way in our worse-than-second-best world (given the 
undesirability of the additional QV investment they may gener-
ate by enabling their employer to profit more from any BCAs they 
create) and since they misallocate resources directly in a variety 
of different ways, they are likely to be allocatively inefficient in 
relation to both the simple kind of single pricing that dominates 
economics textbooks and the more sophisticated kinds of pricing 
systems likely to be adopted if these devices are prohibited. 
In what follows, I will illustrate these points (as well as the 
inadequacy of Bork's unit-output allocative-efficiency test) by 
analyzing the allocative efficiency of price discrimination and one 
type of tie-in, which I call a transaction-surplus-saving94 supra-
marginal-cost price-shifting tie-in. Bork bases his conclusion that 
price discrimination is not generally misallocative on the fact 
that an individual seller's price discrimination seems as likely to 
increase as to decrease its own unit output (in comparison with 
single pricing - i.e., in comparison with a policy of setting a 
single per-unit price and allowing buyers to purchase as much as 
94. Transaction surplus is defined to equal the sum of buyer and seller surplus - i.e., 
the area between the demand curve the seller faces and his marginal cost curve, between 
zero output and the actual output. 
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they want at that price). In fact, if the unit-output price test for 
allocative efficiency were justified, price discrimination might 
even be allocatively justified by its tendency to increase the dis-
criminator's rivals' unit outputs since the ability of a firm to offer 
a low discriminatory price to someone else's customers will induce 
its better-placed rival to charge a lower price (and therefore sell 
a higher unit output). · 
As we have seen, however, one cannot predict a practice's 
allocative efficiency from its effect on unit output. Unfortunately, 
the more sophisticated analysis I outlined in the second section 
suggests that price discrimination is almost certainly less alloca-
tively desirable than single pricing- at least when the discrimi-
natory prices are charged to buyers the relevant seller is best-
placed to serve. Clearly, since price discrimination is more expen-
sive to execute than single pricing (the discriminator must do 
additional market research to determine which of its customers 
place higher and lower values on its product, must incur the extra 
cost of communicating prices individually to its customers, and 
must incur costs to prevent its low-price customers from engaging 
in arbitrage), the practice will be misallocative if it has a neutral 
effect on other sorts of resource allocation. In fact, at least when 
practiced in relation to customers the discriminator is best-
placed to serve, price discrimination seems likely to increase 
other kinds of resource misallocation. Thus, such price discrimi-
nation will tend to generate consumption-optimum misallocation 
by allocating goods from buyers who valued them more highly 
(buyers who would have purchased the relevant product at its 
optimal single price but do not at the higher discriminatory price) 
to buyers who value them less highly (buyers who buy them only 
because of a discriminatory low price). 95 By enabling marginal QV 
investors to reduce the surplus their consumers realize, such 
price discrimination may also exacerbate quantity-vs.-QV in-
vestment misallocation.96 Admittedly, the non-transaction cost 
95. This conclusion relates to the traditional welfare economics proof that consump-
tion-optimum misallocation will arise where the relative cost of two goods to buyers of 
both is not the same at the margin. Obviously, price discrimination does not result in a 
physical transfer of some product X from a higher-demand to a lower-demand buyer. 
Instead, the middle-demand original buyer of X who is offered the higher price purchases 
some product V instead while the low-demand buyer who is offered the lower price buys 
X rather than the W he originally purchased. However, since there is no reason to believe 
that P/MC will differ in Wand V, the resource flows from X-middle (XM) to V and from 
W to X-low (XL) can be treated as a flow from XMto XL (inasmuch as the missing V to 
W link would be allocatively neutral if [P/MClv equalled [P/MC]w. 
96. Recall that the distortion introduced by consumer surplus offsets the larger 
distortions introduced by supracompetitive pricing. Relatedly, price discrimination will 
also cause resource misallocation to the extent that it encourages firms to use resources 
to obtain monopoly positions thro11gh anticompetitive behavior. 
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effects of price discrimination may be desirable when the dis-
criminator offers its low price to someone else's customer. Thus, 
although sales made by competitive inferiors will normally be 
misallocative in themselves (will normally cause intra-industry 
RUO misallocations), a rule that allowed firms to discriminate 
would probably cause not an increase in such sales but a de-
crease in the prices charged by the competitive superiors of the 
potential discriminators. In my terminology, such a rule would 
reduce the OCAs of the discriminator's rivals97 by reducing the 
contextual cost of discrimination. As we have seen, any such 
tendency to reduce prices would improve resource allocation by 
decreasing quantity-vs.-QV investment misallocation, labor-
leisure misallocation, production-process research misallocation, 
and various kinds of income-distribution-related misallocation. 
Thus, even though resources will normally be misallocated by 
price discrimination directed at the seller's own customers, there 
may be an allocative case for allowing sellers to charge discrimi-
natorily low prices to someone else's customers.98 In any case, 
Bork is clearly far too optimistic about the allocative efficiency 
of price discrimination. 
Bork is also too optimistic about the allocative efficiency of 
the vertical devices (such as tying and reciprocal-trading agree-
ments) firms use to increase their ability to exploit their demand-
marginal cost position in their relations with a single customer. I 
will illustrate this point by analyzing the allocative efficiency of 
a type of full requirements tie-in he does not discuss - viz., the 
supramarginal-cost price-shifting tie-in in which a seller X sells 
some product A for a lower unit price than he otherwise would 
have charged on condition that the buyer Y purchase for more 
than its market price its full requirements of a second product B 
(that may be neither a substitute nor a complement of A). 
To analyze such tie-ins, we must first examine the pricing 
strategy a nonperfect competitor would find optimal for an indi-
vidual buyer if that seller could not use tying or reciprocatory 
97. To the extent that differences in the contextual legal costs of discrimination that 
different rivals would face created differences in the amount by which competitive in-
feriors were disadvantaged, the legalization of price discrimination would decrease con-
trived OMs as well by increasing the number of inferiors able to profit in the short run 
from undercutting a given OM. 
98. Such a solution would best be implemented by giving price discriminators a 
"someone else's customer" defense (which resembles vaguely the "meeting competition 
in good faith" defense of our present Robinson-Patman Act). Obviously, the viability of 
this approach depends on the ability of the sellers to prove to a reviewing authority that 
they were not best placed to serve buyers to whom they granted price concessions. 
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agreements. Diagram 2 illustrates the possible strategies such a 
seller could choose ( as well as the functioning of the type of tie-
in with which we are now concerned). In particular, Diagram 2 
shows the position of a seller X who faces curves DDXAY and 
MCXAY when selling product A to buyer Y. If such a seller were 
required to sell A separately, if could use any of three strategies: 
(1) perfect price discrimination {pure lump-sum pricing), which 
it could effectuate by charging the buyer the highest lump-sum· 
fee it would be willing to pay (NIG in a perfectly informed world) 
for the right to purchase A for a per unit price OG equal to its 
transaction-surplus-maximizing (TSM) marginal cost (its mar-
ginal cost at its TSM output - GI, the output at which DDXAY 
and MCx'At intersect);99 (2) conventional single pricing, which 
would be effectuated by charging no lump-sum fee and the supra-
marginal cost price ( qa) associated with the output at which the 
conventional MR and MC curves intersect ( aB); and (3) a mixed 
strategy in which a smaller lump-sum fee (say NKJ in a perfectly 
informed world) is combined with a supracompetitive per unit 
price (say OJ). Obviously, if inform""ation were perfect and trans-
action costs zero, the perfect price-discrimination strategy would 
be optimal, since the lump-sum fee can convert all buyer surplus 
into seller surplus without reducing output and thereby destroy-
ing transaction surplus. In practice, however, pure lump-sum 
pricing is unlikely to be optimal. In a world of imperfect informa-
tion and transaction costs, perfect price discrimination reduces 
its user's profits (in comparision with single pricing) (1) by offer-
ing no protection against his o~ pessimism (when he may under-
estimate the lump-sum Y would pay because he underestimates 
the units¥ expects to buy), 100 (2) by.offering no protection against 
Y's pessimism (where Y underestimates his quantity demand.for 
A and therefore the dollar value of the right to purchase A), 101 (3) 
by increasing the total risk costs he and Y must bear by shifting 
the risk that Y's quantity demand will tum out to be lower than 
99. DDXAvand MCXAyrespectively stand for the demand and marginal cost curves 
X faces when seiling A to Y. 
100. If X underestimates Y's quantity demand for A, X's supramarginal cost price 
will give him unanticipated profits when Y turns out to purchase more A than X antici-
pated. 
101. If Y underestimates his own quantity demand for A, he will also underestimate 
the additional costs X's supramarginal cost price will impose on him (and hence will be 
willing to give X more profits in the form of such unit markups than in the form of a lump-
sum fee). 
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expected from X to ¥1°2 (where Y is more risk-averse or X's uncer-
tainty is smaller than Y's because, for example, retailer Y is inter-
ested in his share of the resale market for A while X is interested 
only in A's overall sales), (4) by increasing the costs X must incur 
to prevent or allow arbitrage (by creating a difference between the 
per unit price Y pays and the average lump-sum plus unit price 
X seeks from other buyers), and (5) by increasing the costs X has 
to incur to negotiate and execute his contract with Y (by compli-
cating the agreement and necessitating a written document). On 
the other hand, except where transactions involve little money, 
single pricing will also be nonoptimal, since it allows much un-
nece~sary consumer surplus to escape, (N/fo:), and destroys (/31~) 
transaction surplus as well by reducing A's unit price sales below 
the transaction-surplus-maximizing level at which DDxAY and 
MCXAY intersect. In general, then, sellers will find it optimal to 
combine a lump-sum fee with some supramarginal cost pricing. 
In particular, the optimizing seller will continue to raise his per 
102. Under a lump-sum pricing arrangement, Y has additional risk because his pay-
ment will not decline proportionately with his quantity demand when his quantity de-
mand turns out to be less than he expected. X is interested in the risk costs Y must bear 
because they influence the size of the lump-sum fee that Yis willing to pay- i.e., because 
they reduce the payment he is willing to make below NIG. 
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unit price and lower his lump-sum fee until the benefits unit-
price increases create (by helping him to overcome his and his 
customer's pessimism, by reducing the sum of his and his cus-
tomer's risk costs, and by decreasing his customer's incentive to 
engage in arbitrage) just equal the costs such increases create by 
reducing output and destroying transaction surplus. Obviously, 
then, one factor that will influence the amount of supramarginal 
cost pricing such a seller will find optimal is the relative amount 
of transaction surplus successive unit price increases must de-
stroy to convert buyers surplus into seller surplus - i.e., the 
seller-surplus-plus buyer-surplus-minus ratio (ASS +/ABS-) for 
marginal increases in prices, 103 where the difference between 
(ASS+) and (ABS-) is the amount of transaction surplus the rele-
vant price increase destroys (ATS-). Ceteris paribus,ASS+/ABS-
will tend to be higher the smaller the original gap between price 
and marginal cost, the greater the original output, the steeper the 
relevant demand curve, and the less positively sloped the relevant 
marginal cost curve. In what follows, I will assume that X's op-
timal independent strategy would be to charge Ya lump-sum fee 
of LMKJ for the right to purchase as much A as he wishes at 
per-unit price OJ (where NML equals the risk costs such an ar-
rangement would impose on Y plus any buyer surplus its strategic 
bargaining position enables it to obtain). 
We should now be able to understand how a tie-in can benefit 
a seller by increasing the efficiency of his supramarginal cost 
pricing by shifting its locus to a different product with a more 
suitable DD-MC combination. As I have suggested, Diagram 2 
illustrates this possibility as well. In addition to DDXAY, MRXAY, 
and MCXAY, Diagram 2 contains four other curves with which we 
will be concerned. All four assume that X manufactures A, that 
Y is a retailer that resells both A and B to final consumers Z, and 
that (for convenience sake) Y's marginal costs are costs of goods 
sold. Thus, (1) DDvAZ is the demand curve Y faces when reselling 
A to Z (since Y is assumed to incur no marginal costs other than 
the costs of goods sold, MRYAZ indicates the value of successive 
units of A to Z [MRvAZ = DDYBz]); (2) DDYBz and MRYBz are 
the demand and marginal revenue curves Y faces when reselling 
B to Z (although this assumption is not essentiaito our analysis, 
Diagram 2 does assume that Y faces a kinky oligopolistic demand 
103. (ASS+) represents the additional surplus a seller can obtain through a margi-
nal increase in his unit price. (ABS-) represents the amount of buyer surplus such a 
marginal price increase will remove from the relevant buyer. 
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when selling B [though not when selling A], that DDyaz is 
kinked at 0 and that MRYBz is therefore discontinuous at the 
associated output up ;104 (3) DD~R,, is the demand curve X 
faces when selling B to Y under a full requirements contract 
(hence the superscript RC) (since such a contract obligates Y to 
treat X as a monopolist of B, the height of DD~y equals the 
value of successive units of B to Y - which on our [marginal 
cost equals cost-of-goods sold] assumption equals MRyaz); 
finally(4) DD:xayindicates the demand curve X would face when 
selling B to Y without a full requirement contract (for simplicity, 
Diagram 2 assumes that B is produced in a perfectly competitive 
market so that DD:xay equals the minimum average total cost of 
B [min ATCa], which also equals its marginal cost to X 
[MC:xay]}. 
X would implement the tie-in with which we are now con-
cerned by offering to reduce the unit price it charges Y for A from 
OJ to OG in exchange for Y's agreement to purchase his full 
requirements of B from X as well for SD = HC more than its 
normal market price. If (as I assume by construction) the extra 
surplus Y expects to obtain on A (JKIG) equals the expected cost 
to him of the full requirements contract on B (CDSH) and if (as 
I also assume) the tie-in does not increase the riskiness of this 
transaction for Y, Y will be indifferent between this tie-in and the 
independent deal on A X would otherwise have offered. How-
ever, X will not in general be indifferent between these two 
options. Thus, on the plus side, the tie-in will tend to be more 
attractive for X, to the extent that the ASS+/ ABS- ratio for the 
price increase on Bis higher than ASS-/ABS+ for the relevant 
price decrease on A. Since in Diagram 2, X can remove CDSH = 
JKLG of buyer surplus by raising its price on B without de-
stroying the KIF in transaction surplus it would have had to 
destroy to remove a comparable amount of surplus by raising its 
104. Kinked oligopolistic demand curves arise in tightly oligopolistic markets in 
which each seller finds that his rivals will not follow his price increases above the prevail-
ing market level though they will match his price decreases below the prevailing level. 
Such a reaction pattern will cause the demand curve to kink since it implies that each 
seller will lose more sales if he raises his price above the prevailing market level than he 
will gain if he lowers his price the same amount below the original prevailing market level. 
Obviously, since each seller will therefore gain more marginal revenue by reducing his 
price to the prevailing market level than he will obtain by lowering his price below the 
prevailing market level, the marginal revenue curve associated with a kinked oligopoly 
demand curve will be discontinuous at the output associated with the kink (e.g., at output 
&pin Diagram 2). The structure portrayed in Diagram 2 could be found in many situa-
tions. For example, if X - a clothing store in a small town - were the only store to sell 
high quality suits (product A) but sold socks and underwear (product B) in competition 
with a department store or Army-Navy store, it might face a kinked oligopoly demand 
curve on B but not A. 
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price on A, the tie-in will yield KIF more profits than X's optimal 
mixed strategy in the situation in question, other things being 
equal. Although this result is associated with the discontinuity in 
DD:S~ in Diagram 2, comparable results can be generated by far 
less restrictive assumptions. Similar·results will occur to the ex-
tent that B's TSM output is higher than A's, -DD-~y is steeper 
than DD~~ over the relevant range, and MCriy is less positively 
sloped than MCXAy'to the left of their respective TSM outputs. 
Of course, any such gains the tie-in achieves will b·e more or less 
offset to the extent that the tie-in's ·supramarginal cost pricing on 
B offers X less protection against arbitrage, pessimism, and risk 
aversion than the supramarginal cost pricing on A it replaces. It 
is obvious that the tie-in clearly will be inferior in some such 
respects. Not only will the tie-in not reduce Y's incentive to en-
gage in arbitrage on A, it will create an additional enforcement 
problem for X by giving Y an incentive to cheat on his require-
ments obligation on B. However, to the extent that Y's quantity 
demands for A and B (at given prices) are always in the same 
proportions, X's supramarginal cost pricing on B may give him 
virtually the same protection against his pessimism, Y's pessi-
mism, and his and Y's risk aversion as the supramarginal cost 
pricing on A it replaces. Thus, since a reseller's (Y's) sales of 
accessories (socks and underwear - B) will often be appropriate 
to his sales of the relevant main item (suits - A) and since many 
resellers ( Y) sell products whose sales depend on the same factor 
(e.g., weather), X can often arrange a tie-in such that (1) X will 
realize unanticipated profits through his supramarginal cost pric-
ing on B (unanticipated because of X's underestimate of Y's 
quantity demand for B) whenever he underestimates Y's quantity 
demand for A and hence the lump-sum fee_ Y wquld be willing to 
pay him; (2) Y will underestimate the cost to him of accepting 
the requirements contracts on B (Y will underestimate his quant-
ity demand for B) whenever he underestimates his quantity de-
mand for A and hence the value of the right to purchase A at its 
TSM-marginal cost (the lump sum fee he should be willing to pay 
X); and (3) the payments Y must give X for A (in the form of 
supramarginal cost prices on B) will decline more or less propor-
tionately with the value to Y of the right to purchase A at its 
TSM-marginal cost (since the former depends on Y's quantity-
demand for B and the latter on Y's quantity-demand for A, which 
we are assuming will fluctuate together). Hence, the type of tie-
in with which we are now concerned will sometimes increase its 
user's profits by reducing the transaction surplus its user's supra-
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marginal cost pricing destroys by more than it raises the user's 
enforcement costs, the losses the user sustains from its and its 
customers' pessimism, and the risk cost the user and its custom-
ers bear. 
Now that I have described the way in which such tie-ins 
enable sellers to better exploit their demand-marginal cost posi-
tions, I should be able to evaluate their allocative efficiency. Un-
happily, at least where A and B are not complements or substi-
tutes, 105 such tie-ins are likely to be allocatively inefficient: the 
savings in transacti,on surplus they generate generally will not be 
associated with an RUO allocative gain in our worse-than-second-
best world, 106 and the investment incentives they create may 
actually exacerbate quantity-vs.-QV investment misallocation, 
while the associated increase in negotiation, enforcement, and 
perhaps risk costs will have allocative as well as private signifi-
cance. In other words, in our worse-than-second-best world, such 
tie-ins are little more than allocatively expensive devices for 
transferring income to their users. 
In short, since many vertical practices work not by creating 
"business efficiencies" but rather by letting their users exploit a 
given demand-marginal cost situation, Bork's presumption that 
such devices are allocatively efficient is unjustifiable. In fact, 
most vertical practices that are designed to enable their employer 
to take better advantage of a given demand-marginal cost posi-
tion are probably misallocative. 
G. The Competitive Effect of Conglomerate Mergers and the 
Toe-Hold Merger Doctrine 
This section will analyze Bork's comments on the competi-
tive effect of conglomerate mergers and the toe-hold merger doc-
trine - i.e., on the consequences of such mergers and doctrines 
for the welfare of the customers of both the MPs and the MPs' 
product market rivals R. 107 I will criticize and propose alternatives 
105. Where A and B are complements or substitutes (e.g., where they are inputs used 
in variable proportions), the saving in transaction surplus is likely to entail an allocative 
as well as a private gain. 
106. Bork's results reflect the fact that marginal cost will tend to be systematically 
below marginal allocative costs in our worse-than-second-best world. 
107. I should emphasize the difference between the competitive impact and alloca-
tive efficiency of conglomerate mergers or conglomerate merger doctrines. In port, this 
difference reflects the fact (already noted) that any tendency a conglomerate merger hos 
to decrease (increase) QV investment competition (e.g., by eliminating an effective poten-
tial competitor) will probably increase (decrease) its allocative efficiency, given the exces-
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to Bork's two basic conclusions in this area: (1) that conglomerate 
mergers can reduce competition in comparison with the status 
quo or the independent entry of the outside firm only if the ac-
quired company is a "significant" firm in a market with only one 
or two such enterprises108 and (2) that the toe-hold merger doc-
trine109 is anti-competitive because acquiring firms will find it 
most profitable to execute the conglomerate merger110 that also 
provides most benefits for the relevant consumers. 111 
1. Conglomerate Merger and the Status Quo 
I reject Bork's first conclusion both (1) because conglomerate 
mergers that eliminate an effective potential competitor will re-
duce competition more often than Bork supposes and (2) because, 
contrary to Bork's belief, such mergers can also reduce competi-
tion by facilitating contrived oligopolistic (and predatory) pric-
ing.112 Bork's claim that the elimination of an effective potential 
siveness of QV investment in our economy. In part, however, this difference reflects the 
divergence between the competitive value and allocative value of a given efficiency. For 
example, the competitive value of any marginal static efficiency a conglomerate merger 
generates for the MPs will be equal to the amount by which it induces the MPs' Rs to 
lower their prices by decreasing such firms' OCAs - i.e., by reducing the MPs' basic 
competitive disadvantages. Thus, a static marginal efficiency would have substantial 
allocative but no competitive value if the two MPs were always either best placed or far-
worse-than-second-best placed. In fact, even where such an efficiency has some competi-
tive value - e.g., even where it reduces the MPs' costs in relation to customers they were 
originally second-best placed to serve, its allocative value (which will depend primarily 
on the allocative gains associated with the tendency of any related price reductions to 
lower QV investment in the relevant market) will bear little relation to its competitive 
value (which will be equal to the extent of the price reductions themselves). 
108. See R. BoR1<, supra note 1, at 260. 
109. Put crudely, the toe-hold merger doctrine prohibits outside firms from executing 
with relatively large inside firms conglomerate mergers that would increase competition 
in comparison with the status quo or any entry the outside firms might otherwise have 
undertaken. In other words, the toe-hold merger doctrine restricts outside firms to 
making so-called toe-hold mergers with relatively small inside firms. 
110. Although Bork never admits to this possibility, the doctrine actually presup-
poses a monotonic relationship between the firm and consumer benefits that would be 
generated by the preferred merger and all the alternative behaviors the initiating firm 
might engage in (including not only the alternative conglomerate mergers it could execute 
in the market in question, but also the alternative conglomerate mergers it could execute 
into other markets, the internal expansions it could undertake into the instant or other 
markets in which the acquiring firm was or was not already participating, the alternative 
horizontal mergers it could execute, or the various decisions it could make to release 
managers or capital and thereby make them available to alternative users). Like Bork, I 
will ignore these other possibilities in the text that follows. Obviously, their existence 
provides one more reason to reject his argument against the toe-hold merger doctrine. 
111. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 261-62. 
112. Of course, one could argue that this effect should not count against the legality 
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competitor will not reduce competition unless there are fewer 
than three significant firms in the relevant market113 reflects the 
same misperception that distorted his conclusions about the com-
petitive impact of horizontal mergers: his apparent belief (1) that 
QV investment cannot vary in any given market (so that a con-
glomerate merger that eliminates an actual or threatened entry 
cannot thereby affect the intensity of QV investment competi-
tion);114 (2) that nonmonopolists enjoy no BCAs (so that a con-
glomerate merger that deters an entry or established firm QV 
investment cannot reduce BCAs); and (3) that oligopolistic mar-
gins cannot be contrived unless there are fewer than three signifi-
cant firms in the market (so that in other circumstances a con-
glomerate merger cannot increase contrived oligopolistic mar-
gins). Since all of these beliefs conflict with the realities of our 
monopqlistically competitive world, conglomerate mergers that 
eliminate effective potential competitors115 will always reduce 
of the conglomerate merger - that such illegal pricing should be prosecuted when and if 
it does occur. In fact, I find this argument quite persuasive where predatory pricing is 
concerned. However, oligopolistic pricing is sufficiently more common and sufficiently less 
detectable to make me want to count against a merger any tendency it has to facilitate 
this practice. I should note that I agree with Bork's rejection of many of the other argu-
ments which have been used to attack conglomerate mergers - e.g., the arguments that 
they would reduce competition by lowering costs, creating (71'n+ R) barriers to entry, or 
creating opportunities for reciprocal dealing. 
113. In fact, Bork assumes that competition will not be injured even if there are fewer 
than three significant firms in the acquired firm's market unless the acquired firm itself 
is one of the significant firms in question. Bork offers no argument for this qualification 
and I am unable to understand its basis. See R. Boru<, supra note 1, at 260. 
114. Bork does not discuss the ways or circumstances in which the elimination of a 
potential competitor can affect competition. In particular, although he seems to accept 
the limit price or wings theory that the presence of an effective potential competitor can 
induce a market's established firms tp lower their prices and increase their unit outputs 
(see R. BORK, supra note 1, at the first line of page 260), he never explicitly addresses this 
issue. In fact, I doubt that potential competition ever induces established firms to lower 
their prices in the hope of deterring entry, for I suspect that such limit pricing (1) would 
rarely succeed in deterring entry, (2) would rarely be more profitable than allowing entry 
to occur even if it were effective, and (3) would rarely be as profitable as the various other 
methods established firms could adopt to deter entry - e.g., by making additional QV 
(limit) investments themselves. Accordingly, I believe that a conglomerate merger that 
eliminates an effective potential competitor will reduce competition either by precluding 
the entry he would have executed or by obviating and deterring the limit investments his 
presence would have induced. See Limit Price Theory, supra note 13, at 668-82. 
115. Bork also does not discuss the circumstances in which an outsider is likely to be 
an effective potential competitor. The courts have sometimes talked as if an outsider will 
be effective only if he would have entered absent the merger in question. However, the 
fact that a potential entrant would not have entered - indeed would not have even 
contemplated entry - is coµsistent with his being effective since it may reflect his having 
induced his established rivals to invest sufficiently to make entry patently unprofitable 
for him. In practice, a uniquely best-placed potential entrant will be effective whenever 
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competition in the above three ways - whether or not they in-
volve markets with less than three significant firms - though 
these anti-competitive effects may be more or less offset by the 
pro-competitive tendencies of the various kinds of efficiencies 
such mergers can generate. 
I also believe that conglomerate mergers can reduce competi-
tion even where they do not eliminate an effective potential com-
petitor by facilitating contrived oligopolistic116 and predatory 
pricing.· A conglomerate merger between an outside firm K and 
an inside firm E will always facilitate E's contrived oligopolistic 
pricing by enabling E to exploit K's reputation for fulfilling his 
threats and promises and by increasing the credibility of E's 
threats by increasing the benefits retaliation will generate (by 
enabling KE's K divisions to exploit the retaliation's enhancing 
effect on the new company's tough reputation). Moreover, where 
the conglomerate merger partners K and E have a common con-
glomerate rival KR.Ert:, who is active in both the E market and 
some of K's original markets, the K-E merger may facilitate K's 
and E's contrived oligopolistic pricing by enabling them simul-
taneously to communicate to KRER their joint intention to retali-
ate or reciprocate, by enabling them to pool customers to detect 
undercutting and identify their undercutter, by enabling them to 
pool other information about the competitive positions of various 
rivals that also will facilitate undercutter identification, by en-
abling them to decrease the cost of effective retaliation by in-
the ('11' 0 + R + S + L)N barriers he faces are less than the (:'11'0 + R + S + L)E + M* barriers and disincentives that would confront the established firm that would be best-
placed to expand QV investment to the entry-precluding level. This result implies that 
such a potential competitor will be most likely to be effective (1) where the established 
firms do not possess patents or raw material monopolies that make ('11'o)N exceed ('11'0 )E, 
(2) where market demand is rising sufficiently rapidly to raise the rate at which the 
established firms have to expand to preclude entry to a level at which (1r0 )i;: for the last 
necessary expansion exceeds (1r0)N for the best-placed potential competitor's entry, and 
(3) where the market contains only a few large potential expanders and new projects are 
inevitably equally competitive with all their predecessors - so that M* is positive and 
significant. By extension, our analysis also implies that a potential competitor who is 
either worse-than-best placed or nonuniquely best placed to enter will also be effective 
whenever the entry of his superior and equals would not make entry unprofitable for him 
if his established rivals made no limit investments. For a further discussion of the effec-
tiveness of potential competitors, see Limit Price Theory, supra note 13, at 684-90. 
116. The Justice Department has recently begun to argue that conglomerate mergers 
can facilitate such pricing, which it refers to as "conglomerate interdependence and for-
bearance." See, e.g., United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,. 324 F. Supp. 19 
(D. Conn. 1970). · 
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creasing their K division's retaliation against KRER and by re-
ducing their E division's retaliation, or vice versa (where the 
harm-inflicted to cost-incurred ratio for the last act of retalia-
tion that would be necessary for an independent K against KRER 
is higher than its counterpart for an independent E), and by en-
abling KE to use any excess reciprocatory power K or E enjoyed 
in its relations with KRER. In fact, in such circumstances, the 
K-E merger will also facilitate KRER's contrived oligopolistic 
pricing by reducing its communication costs to K and E, by re-
ducing its costs of retaliating effectively against K and E by per-
mitting it to retaliate where the relevant marginal harm to cost 
ratio is best, and by letting it use any excess reciprocatory power 
it has vis-A-vis either of these MPs. Moreover, the power-pooling 
argument described above also implies that such conglomerate 
mergers will reduce the cost and increase the profitability of 
predatory pricing.117 
Of course, conglomerate mergers that eliminate an effective 
potential competitor or facilitate contrived oligopolistic or preda-
tory pricing may still increase competition in comparison with 
the status quo or with the independent entry of the outside MP, 
for such mergers may also generate static and dynamic efficien-
cies which increase competition in many ways. Thus, my analysis 
suggests that the competitive effect of any conglomerate merger 
will depend on (1) the factors that determine the effectiveness of 
potential competition, 118 (2) whether the acquiring firm was, or 
was close to being, the relevant market's best-placed potential 
entrant, (3) the factors that affect the pre-merger profitability of 
contrived oligopolistic pricing to the established merger partner 
E, 119 ( 4) whether Kand E have a common rival KRER and whether 
K has a tougher reputation than E, (5) the size of the dynamic 
and marginal static efficiencies the merger generates, 120 and (6) 
whether E was, or was close to being, better placed to make an 
additional QV investment than any other established or potential 
competitor, and the frequency with which E was, or was close to 
being, some established rival's closest competitor. 
117. A conglomerate merger may also facilitate predatozy pricing by giving E access 
to K's capital. But see note 112 supra. 
118. See note 115 supra. 
119. See note 61 supra; text at notes 57-60 supra. 
120. As I have already suggested in the horizontal merger context, one could develop 
a decentralizing decision procedure that would make the decision to merge depend on the 
pro-competitive impact of such efficiencies without requiring the government to estimate 
their magnitude. 
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2. The Competitive Impact of the Toe-Hold Merger Doctrine 
Bork bases his conclusion that the application of the toe-hold 
merger doctrine will always decrease competition on two prem-
ises: (1) that the private profitability of a conglomerate merger 
to its initiator depends solely on its ability to generate business 
efficiencies and (2) that the value to the relevant consumers of 
the efficiencies alternative mergers would generate always in-
creases with their value to the merger's initiator. This section will 
explain why I reject both these premises and why the toe-hold 
merger doctrine may in fact tend to achieve its goal of increasing 
competition. 
I reject the first premise because, as we have already seen, 
K may find a K-El merger profitable for nonefficiency as well as 
for efficiency reasons. K may be able to profit from a K-El merger 
(1) because the merger facilitates K's and El's contrived oligopol-
istic (and predatory) pricing, (2) because K can induce El to sell 
itself on favorable terms (a) by threatening to enter itself or (b) 
by threatening to execute with some alternative established firm 
E2 a merger that would substantially and uniquely121 increase the 
damage E2 could (legally) do to El, 122 and (3) by enabling K to 
exploit various investor misperceptions.123 Moreover, there is no 
reason to believe that the merger that generates the most profit-
able efficiency for K will also incr~ase K's profits most for these 
nonefficiency reasons. For example, the fact that a K-El merger 
would generate more marginal efficiencies than a K-E2 merger 
does not imply that K could gain more by threatening El with a 
merger with E2 than by threatening E2 with a merger with El. 
Hence, I suspect that firms like K will often profit most from 
mergers that generate fewer profitable efficiencies than their al-
ternatives. Hence, even if the value of such efficiencies to K and 
the relevant consumers were monotonically related, 124 one could 
not assume that K would always choose the merger that gener-
121. Obviously, if El's merger with K would simply result in another outside firm's 
executing an equally damaging merger with E2, K's threat would not be efficacious. 
122. For example, a K-E2 merger would increase this damage ifit generated marginal 
static efficiencies for E2 and E2 originally was often El's closest rival. 
123. See P. STEINER, MERGERS (1975). I should note, however, that even if this motiva-
tion accounted for a substantial number of the conglomerate mergers of the 1960s, inves-
tors have probably learned enough from the subsequent performance of the companies 
involved to make it an unimportant cause of future conglomerate mergers. 
124. I.e., even if an increase in the private profitability of the relevant efficiencies was 
always associated with an increase in the benefits they generated for the consumers in 
question. 
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ated efficiencies that were most beneficial to the relevant con-
sumers (much less the merger that was most beneficial to such 
consumers overall). 
In fact, however, the business and consumer benefits various 
efficiencies will generate are not monotonically related. I would 
be surprised if the value to buyers of the static and dynamic 
efficiencies alternative conglomerate mergers can generate were 
even highly correlated with their value to the MPs. Let me treat 
static efficiencies first. The value of a marginal static efficiency 
(that will not carry forward to an expansion) to the merged con-
cern will equal the amount by which it increases the concern's 
OCAs in relation to those customers the concern was originally 
best placed to serv·e plus the amount of new OCAs it creates by 
increasing the number of customers the merged concern is best 
placed to obtain. On the other hand, if the merged firm takes full 
advantage of the increase in its OCAs and if the merger does not 
affect the net position of the relevant buyers by changing the 
contextual costs of the merged firm and its rivals, the benefits 
such marginal static efficiencies confer on buyers in the merged 
firm's market will equal the amount by which they reduce the 
merged firm's rivals' BCAs. More particularly, when the merged 
firm is second-best placed both before and after the merger, the 
benefit the buyer receives will equal the size of the relevant effi-
ciency; when the merged firm was second-best placed before the 
merger but is best placed after, the benefit will equal the size of 
the original best placed supplier's BCA; finally, when the merged 
firm was worse-than-second-best placed pre-merger but second-
best placed post-merger, the relevant benefit will equal the dif-
ference between the size of the efficiency achieved in relation to 
the customer in question and the amount by which the estab-
lished merger partner was originally worse-than-second-best 
placed. 
Obviously, then, it is reasonably likely that the conglomerate 
merger whose efficiencies add most to its participants' joint re-
turns will be less beneficial to the relevant buyers on this account 
than an alternative merger that will improve the marginal static 
position of a company that is often second- or close-to-second-
best placed, despite the fact that the latter merger would confer 
more benefits on the relevant market's buyers. Hence, at least 
where marginal static efficiencies are concerned, the premise that 
the value of efficiencies to sellers and buyers are monotonically 
related fails. 
Moreover, even excluding the perverse cases in which a 
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merger-induced reduction in the established partner's (11"0 + R) 
barriers reduces competition, the value of a dynamic efficiency 
(or that portion that carries over to an expansion) to the merger 
partners and its value to the market's customers are unlikely to 
correlate strongly. On the one hand, the private value of such an 
efficiency-induced expansion to the merged firm equals the dif-
ference between the supranormal profits it nominally yields ( the 
OCAs and OMs the merged firm realizes on the new project 
minus the normal amount of profits on the investment in ques-
tion) and the avoidable damage it does to the established part-
ners' pre-existing projects. On the other hand, the value of such 
an efficiency-induced expansion to the relevant consumers equals 
the sum of the consumer surplus they realize when buying the 
new product or patronizing the new outlet or plant and the value 
to them of the price cuts its introduction induces suppliers of the 
original product set to make. Thus, an aspiring conglomerate 
merger participant may execute a merger that permits an 
efficiency-induced expansion that is less valuable to the relevant 
consumers than the expansion an alternative merger would have 
induced because the expansion the executed merger permits (1) 
tended less to benefit consumers by reducing or eliminating var-
ious rivals' BCAs (and OMs), (2) generated less consumer surplus 
for the buyers of the new product or service, or (3) did more 
damage to the pre-existing projects of the established merger 
partner. Hence, even if the conglomerate merger partners can 
profit from the tendency of their merger to increase the estab-
lished partner's ability to expand, the conglomerate merger that 
maximizes the profits the merged concern realizes on its merger-
induced expansion may not maximize the benefits the outsider's 
merger confers on the relevant market's buyers. Moreover, in 
some cases, th~ outsider may choose a merger that will not gener-
ate any dynamic efficiencies because the tendency of an alterna-
tive merger to increase the ability of a prospective established 
partner to expand may actually reduce the merged concern's 
profits. This perverse result will obtain when the merger-
generated reduction in the established partner's (11"0 + R) barriers 
will harm the merged concern by inducing another (still better 
placed) established firm to ·make a QVinvestment by eliminating 
the monopolistic investment disincentives that previously de-
terred its expansion (by making it profitable for the merged firm 
to expand if the rival in question did not). Accordingly, even if 
conglomerate firms always executed the merger that generated 
efficiencies that were most valuable for them, and even if these 
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conglomerate mergers never injured buyers, they would often not 
execute the merger that would have most benefited the relevant 
market's buyers. 
Of course, the unpersuasiveness of Bork's argument against 
the toe-hold merger doctrine does not imply that the doctrine 
itself makes any sense. However, a tentative defense can be of-
fered for the toe-hold merger doctrine, or at least for its premise 
that - from the perspective of the goal of increasing competition 
- K's choice of a merger partner will be distorted in the direction 
of relatively large established firms (EL) as opposed to relatively 
small established firms (Es). 
Such a distortion could arise for two different sorts of rea-
sons. First, a K-Er, merger might be more likely to increase K's 
profits by performing functions that did not benefit, or indeed 
actually harmed, the relevant buyers - e.g., by enabling K to 
better use its ability to harm its merger partner by entering itself 
or merging with an alternative firm or by increasing the merged 
firm's ability to contrive oligopolistic prices. Second, the value to 
K-EL of the efficiencies a K-EL merger would generate may ex-
ceed its counterpart for a K-Es merger by more than the contri-
bution a K-EL merger would make to the relevant buyers' welfare 
would exceed its conterpart for a K-EL merger. I suspect that, on 
both these accounts, K-Ei' mergers will be relatively more attrac-
tive to K than they are beneficial to the relevant buyers. In gen-
eral, K can probably inflict more harm on larger than on smaller 
established firms. Moreover, K-EL mergers will be likely to in-
crease K's and EL's total contrived OMs more than K-E8 mergers 
will increase K's and Es's (since EL has more customers to exploit 
and more information to contribute to K - though these effects 
will be offset to the extent that EL has less need for K's informa-
tion). In addition, since the ratio of the times large firms are best 
placed to the times they are second-best or close-to-second-best 
placed may well be higher than its counterpart for small firms, 12;; 
the marginal static efficiencies K-Ei mergers generate may be 
relatively more profitable than beneficial to consumers relative to 
their K-E8 counterparts. Finally, in comparison with their K-Es 
125. Recall that the contribution marginal efficiencies make to the merged firm is a 
function of the number of customers the MPs are best placed to serve, while the contribu-
tion such efficiencies make to the relevant buyers is a function of the number of times 
the MPs are second-best placed. If .relatively large firms tend to produce differentiated 
goods that consumers either strongly prefer or do not particularly like while relatively 
small firms tend to produce cheaper, less differentiated goods that are many buyers' 
second choices, the textual assumption would be justified. 
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counterparts, the dYIJ.amic efficiencies ( or static efficiencies that 
apply to expansions as well) that K-Ei,· mergers generate will also 
be relatively more profitable to the merged firm than they are 
beneficial to the relevant buyers (since EL is likely to have greater 
monopolistic incentives to expand126 and since EL's new variant 
will reduce the OCA to an independent rival less often than 
E's).121 
Of course, these results would not justify a toe-hold merger 
doctrine unless the distortions they establish are typically critical 
- i.e., unless the K-Es mergers would typically be more pro-
competitive when they were less profitable and the K-Es mergers 
are profitable in themselves (would be executed if the K-EL merg-
ers were prohibited). Still, the competitive case for the toe-hold 
merger doctrine is considerably stronger than Bork's conclusion 
suggests. 128 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Antitrust Paradox offers much to any lawyer or econo-
mist concerned with antitrust. The book concisely explicates the 
nonscale business efficiencies which various horizontal, verti-
cal, and conglomerate practices can generate, cogently analyzes 
the significance and interaction of various legal doctrines, and 
clearly illuminates the economic behavior involved in many 
individual cases. 
Unfortunately, however, although Bork is generally right 
about what's wrong, he is usually wrong about what's right. In my 
opinion, Bork's approach is undermined by his failure to consider 
the full implications of monopolistic competition and second 
best. In particular, I believe that this failure has led him to mis-
formulate the antitrust laws' tests oflegality; to ignore the impor-
tant distinction between the standards the current antitrust laws 
contain and those that would be established by an allocatively 
optimal antitrust policy; to misspecify the conditions for resource 
126. This argument would cut against the toe-hold merger doctrine if EL and E8 
typically faced monopolistic disincentives - i.e., typically were uniquely well placed to 
add to their industry's QV investment. However, I believe that firms will rarely occupy 
such a position. 
127. This result is implied by the fact that buyers will not benefit if EL'S new variant 
is better-placed to steal one of EL's original customers than any of EL's original rivals for 
such customers (since E'L will not compete against itself). 
128. If I could surmount my own doubts about the legitimacy of such comparisons 
under the current antitrust laws, I would undoubtedly prefer an approach that is more 
selective than the toe-hold merger doctrine's crude rule - i.e., that determined on a case-
by-case basis whether the outside firm could have executed profitable and competitively 
superior mergers in the relevant market. 
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misallocation; to misstate the probable allocative efficiency of 
various business practices; to underestimate the feasibiliy of oli-
gopolistic, retaliatory, and predatory pricing; and to overlook the 
possibility that nonoligopolistic restrictions of unit output, qual-
ity, and variety might also occur in the absence of a traditional 
monopoly. 
Many of the phenomena with which The Antitrust Paradox 
is concerned cannot be adequately studied with currently ac-
cepted conceptual structures. To progress, we will need a vocabu-
lary that facilitates theorizing about the phenomena I have 
termed QV investment, QV investment competition, QV invest-
ment misallocation, (natural and contrived) oligopolistic mar-
gins, competitive advantages, contextual costs, individualized 
pricing, and across-the-board pricing. Regrettably, I suspect that 
the resulting theories will justify many positive, legal, and policy 
conclusions that are inconsistent with Professor Bork's sanguine 
judgments about the efficiency of an unregulated economy. Most 
important, I suspect that such analyses will demonstrate that 
oligopolistic and predatory pricing are more troublesome than 
Bork supposes, that horizontal and conglomerate mergers are 
anti-competitive and misallocative more often than he believes, 
and that various vertical practices are less inherently desirable 
than he concludes. In any case, I am confident that if such theo-
ries are combined with the valid insights Bork so effectively com-
municates in The Antitrust Paradox, they will enable the courts, 
the legislatures, and their company to make better legal and pol-
icy decisions. 129 
129. There is considerable evidence that the Burger Court is far more ready than its 
predecessors to accept the kinds of sophisticated economic arguments that Professor Bork 
and I are advocating. See Markovits, The Burger Court, Antitrust, and Economic 
Analysis, in a forthcoming collection of essays on the Burger Court, edited by Vincent 
Blasi and published by the American Society of Law Teachers. 
